Independent Natural Extension for Infinite Spaces by De Bock, Jasper
ar
X
iv
:1
80
5.
01
13
9v
2 
 [m
ath
.PR
]  
24
 Se
p 2
01
8
INDEPENDENT NATURAL EXTENSION FOR INFINITE SPACES
Independent Natural Extension for Infinite Spaces
Jasper De Bock JASPER.DEBOCK@UGENT.BE
Ghent University - ELIS, SYSTeMS
Technologiepark – Zwijnaarde 914, 9052 Zwijnaarde, Belgium
Abstract
We define and study the independent natural extension of two local uncertainty models for the
general case of infinite spaces, using the frameworks of sets of desirable gambles and conditional
lower previsions. In contrast to Miranda and Zaffalon (2015), we adoptWilliams-coherence instead
of Walley-coherence. We show that our notion of independent natural extension always exists—
whereas theirs does not—and that it satisfies various convenient properties, including factorisation
and external additivity. The strength of these properties depends on the specific type of epistemic
independence that is adopted. In particular, epistemic event-independence is shown to outperform
epistemic atom-independence. Finally, the cases of lower expectations, expectations, lower prob-
abilities and probabilities are obtained as special instances of our general definition. By applying
our results to these instances, we demonstrate that epistemic independence is indeed epistemic, and
that it includes the conventional notion of independence as a special case.
Keywords: independent natural extension; epistemic independence; Williams-coherence; infinite
spaces; sets of desirable gambles; conditional lower previsions.
1. Introduction
When probabilities are imprecise, in the sense that they are only partially specified, it is no longer
clear what it means for two variables to be independent (Couso et al., 1999). One approach is to
apply the standard notion of independence to every element of some set of probability measures.
The alternative, called epistemic independence, is to define independence as mutual irrelevance,
in the sense that receiving information about one of the variables will not affect our uncertainty
model for the other. The advantage of this intuitive alternative is that it has a much wider scope:
since epistemic independence is expressed in terms of uncertainty models instead of probabilities,
it can easily be applied to a variety of such models, including non-probabilistic ones. We here focus
on sets of desirable gambles and conditional lower previsions, the latter of which includes lower
expectations, expectations, lower probabilities and probabilities as special cases.
When an assessment of epistemic independence is combined with local uncertainty models,
it leads to a unique corresponding joint uncertainty model that is called the independent natu-
ral extension. If the variables involved can take only a finite number of values, this independent
natural extension always exists, and it then satisfies various convenient properties that allow for
the design of efficient algorithms (de Cooman et al., 2011; de Cooman and Miranda, 2012). If the
variables involved take values in an infinite set, the situation becomes more complicated. On the
one hand, for the specific case of lower probabilities, Vicig (2000) managed to obtain results that
resemble those of the finite case. On the other hand, for the more general case of lower previ-
sions, Miranda and Zaffalon (2015) recently found that the independent natural extension may not
even exist.
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Our main contribution consists in generalising the results of Vicig (2000) to the case of condi-
tional lower previsions, using sets of desirable gambles as an intermediate step. The key technical
difference with Miranda and Zaffalon (2015) is that we use Williams-coherence (Williams, 1975,
2007) instead of Walley-coherence (Walley, 1991). This difference turns out to be crucial because
our notion of independent natural extension always exists. Furthermore, as we will see, it satisfies
the same convenient properties that are known to hold in the finite case, including factorisation and
external additivity.
An essential feature of our approach is that we adopt a very general notion of epistemic inde-
pendence, where the choice of conditioning events is initially left open. Important examples such as
epistemic atom-independence and epistemic event-independence are then obtained as special cases.
In this way, we are able to study the effect of different types of epistemic independence on the
resulting notion of independent natural extension.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. We start in Section 2 by introducing some basic
technical concepts and notation that will be needed further on. Next, in Section 3, we explain how
uncertainty can be modelled with sets of desirable gambles and conditional lower previsions. For
readers that are unfamiliar with these frameworks, this section serves as a stand-alone introduction.
With all these preliminaries in place, the paper then moves on to its main contributions, which we
report on in Sections 4–7. Section 4 introduces our general notion of epistemic independence and
explains how it subsumes epistemic atom- and event-independence as special cases. Next, Section 5
introduces our central object of interest, which is the independent natural extension, and Section 6
discusses the extent to which it depends on the specific type of epistemic independence that is
adopted. Crucially, we find that in our approach, regardless of the chosen type of epistemic inde-
pendence, the independent natural extension always exists. Our external additivity and factorisation
results are reported on in Section 7; the strength of these results does depend on the chosen type of
epistemic independence. In the last part of the paper, which consists of Sections 8 and 9, we reinter-
pret our results in terms of lower expectations, expectations, lower probabilities and probabilities.
Section 8 recalls how all of these models are special cases of conditional lower previsions, which
then enables us to apply our results to them in Section 9. We also use this connection to explain
why epistemic independence is indeed epistemic, and how it includes the conventional notion of
independence as a special case. We end the paper in Section 10 with a brief summary of our main
results and findings. The proofs of our results are gathered in an appendix.
Finally, I would like to add that this paper is an extended version of an earlier conference version;
see De Bock (2017). The most substantial additions are the results in Sections 8 and 9 and the proofs
in Appendix A. We have also added several examples.
2. Preliminaries and Notation
We use N to denote the natural numbers without zero and let N0 := N∪{0}. R is the set of real
numbers and Q is the set of rational numbers. Sign restrictions are imposed with subscripts. For
example, we let R>0 be the set of positive real numbers and let Q≥0 be the set of non-negative
rational numbers. The extended real numbers are denoted by R := R∪{−∞,+∞}.
For any non-empty set X , the power set of X —the set of all subsets of X —is denoted by
P(X ), and we let P /0(X ) := P(X ) \ { /0} be the set of all non-empty subsets of X . Elements
of P(X ) are called events. A set of events B ⊆ P(X ) is called a field if it is non-empty and
closed with respect to complements and finite intersections and unions. If it is also closed with
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respect to countable intersections and unions, it is called a sigma field. A partition of X is a set
B ⊆ P /0(X ) of pairwise disjoint non-empty subsets of X whose union is equal to X . We also
adopt the notational trick of identifying X with the set of atoms {{x} : x ∈X }, which allows us
to regard X as a partition of X .
A bounded real-valued function on X will be called a gamble on X . The set of all gambles
on X is denoted by G (X ), the set of all non-negative gambles on X is denoted by G≥0(X ), and
we let G>0(X ) := G≥0(X ) \ {0} be the set of all non-negative non-zero gambles. For any set of
gambles A ⊆ G (X ), we let
posi(A ) :=
{
n
∑
i=1
λi fi : n ∈ N,λi ∈ R>0, fi ∈A
}
(1)
and
E (A ) := posi (A ∪G>0(X )) . (2)
Indicators are a particular type of gamble. For any A ∈P(X ), the corresponding indicator IA of A
is a gamble in G≥0(X ), defined for all x ∈X by IA(x) := 1 if x ∈ A and IA(x) := 0 otherwise.
Finally, for any—possibly empty—B ⊆ P /0(X ), we will also require the notion of a non-
negative B-measurable gamble, which we define as a uniform limit of simple B-measurable gam-
bles.
Definition 1 Let B ⊆ P /0(X ). We call g ∈ G≥0(X ) a simple B-measurable gamble if there are
c0 ∈ R≥0, n ∈ N0 and, for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}, ci ∈ R≥0 and Bi ∈B, such that g= c0+∑
n
i=1 ciIBi .
Definition 2 Let B ⊆P /0(X ). A gamble g ∈ G≥0(X ) is B-measurable if it is a uniform limit of
non-negative simple B-measurable gambles, in the sense that there is a sequence {gn}n∈N of simple
B-measurable gambles in G≥0(X ) such that limn→+∞ sup |g−gn|= 0.
Readers that are familiar with the concepts of simple and measurable functions that are common
in measure theory will observe some similarities. However, there are some important differences as
well. On the one hand, our definitions are more restrictive: we only consider bounded non-negative
functions, Definition 1 requires that the coefficients ci are non-negative, and Definition 2 considers
uniform limits instead of pointwise limits. On the other hand, our definitions are more general
because we allow for B to be any subset of P /0(X ). Nevertheless, if B∪{ /0} is a sigma field, we
have the following equivalence.
Proposition 3 Consider any B ⊆P /0(X ) such that B
∗ := B∪{ /0} is a sigma field. Then for any
g ∈ G≥0(X ), g is B
∗-measurable in the measure-theoretic sense (Nielsen, 1997, Definition 10.1) if
and only if it is B-measurable in the sense of Definition 2.
The proof of this result is based on the following sufficient condition forB-measurability, which
provides a convenient tool for establishing the B-measurability of a given function. In particular, it
implies that every non-negative gamble is P /0(X )-measurable.
Proposition 4 Let B ⊆P /0(X ) and g ∈ G≥0(X ). If, for all r ∈ Q≥0, the set {x ∈X : g(x) ≥ r}
is a finite union of pairwise disjoint events in B∪{X , /0}, then g is B-measurable.
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Corollary 5 Every g ∈ G≥0(X ) is P /0(X )-measurable.
The following three examples provide these abstract concepts and results with some intuition,
by studying the (non-)B-measurability of various functions, for different choices of B. They also
demonstrate that B-measurability is easier to achieve if B contains more events.
Example 1 Let X = N and let g ∈ G≥0(X ) be defined by g(x) := 1/x for all x ∈ N. Corollary 5
then trivially implies that g is P /0(N)-measurable. However, g is also B-measurable for some strict
subsets B of P /0(N). For example, Proposition 4 implies that g is N-measurable, because for every
r ∈Q≥0, the set
{x ∈N : g(x) ≥ r} = {x ∈N :
1
x
≥ r}=


/0 if r > 1
{1, . . . ,⌊1/r⌋} if 0< r ≤ 1
N if r = 0
is clearly a finite union of pairwise disjoint events in B∪{X , /0} = N∪{N, /0}. The set B cannot
be too small though. For example, in the extreme case where B = /0, g is no longer B-measurable.
The easiest way to see this is to infer from Definition 1 that simple /0-measurable gambles are
constant. Therefore, since uniform limits of constant gambles are constant, Definition 2 implies that
all /0-measurable gambles are constant. Hence, since g is not constant, it is not /0-measurable. ♦
Example 2 Let X = N and let Iodd ∈ G≥0(N) be the indicator of the odd numbers, defined for all
x ∈ N by Iodd(x) = 1 if x is odd and Iodd(x) = 0 otherwise. Similarly, let Ieven ∈ G≥0(N) be the
indicator of the even numbers, defined by Ieven(x) := 1 if x is even and Ieven(x) := 0 otherwise. Here
too, it follows from Corollary 5 that Iodd and Ieven are P /0(N)-measurable. However, as we are
about to prove, and in contrast with the previous example, Iodd and Ieven are not N-measurable. We
focus on Iodd; the argument for Ieven is completely analogous.
Assume ex absurdo that Iodd isN-measurable. It then follows from Definition 2 that there is some
simple N-measurable function g ∈ G≥0 such that |Iodd(x)−g(x)| < 1/2 for all x ∈ N. Since B = N,
Definition 1 then implies that there is some c0 ∈R≥0 and some finite set A such that g(x) = c0 for all
x ∈ N\A. Since N contains infinitely many odd and even numbers, this in turn implies that there is
some (and in fact infinitely many) odd xodd and even xeven in N\A for which g(xodd) = g(xeven) = c0.
Hence, we find that
1= |Iodd(xodd)− Iodd(xeven)| ≤ |Iodd(xodd)− c0|+ |c0− Iodd(xeven)|
= |Iodd(xodd)−g(xodd)|+ |g(xeven)− Iodd(xeven)|<
1
2
+
1
2
= 1,
a contradiction. ♦
Example 3 Let X = R and let B := B∗ \ { /0}, with B∗ the σ -algebra of Lebesgue measurable
subsets of R. Let g ∈ G≥0(R) be the indicator of the non-negative reals, defined for all x ∈ R by
g(x) := 1 if x ≥ 0 and g(x) := 0 otherwise, and let h ∈ G (R) be defined by h(x) := x3 for all x ∈ R.
Then g is Lebesgue measurable because it is a step function and h is Lebesgue measurable because
it is continuous. Therefore, it follows from Proposition 3 that g and h are B-measurable. ♦
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3. Modelling Uncertainty
A subject’s uncertainty about a variable X that takes values x in some non-empty set X can be
mathematically represented in various ways. The most popular such method is probability theory,
but it is by no means the only one, nor is it the most general one. We here adopt the more general
frameworks of sets of desirable gambles and conditional lower previsions.
The main aim of this section is to provide an overview of the basic technical aspects of these
frameworks, because they will be essential in the rest of the paper. Notably, we do not impose any
constraints on the cardinality of X : it may be finite, countably infinite or uncountably infinite. Con-
nections with other—perhaps better known—models for uncertainty, including probability theory,
will be briefly touched upon at the end of this section; detailed connections will be established in
Section 8.
The basic idea behind sets of desirable gambles is to model a subject’s uncertainty about X by
considering her attitude towards gambles—bets—on X . In particular, we consider the gambles
f ∈ G (X ) that she finds desirable, in the sense that she is willing to engage in a transaction where,
once the actual value x ∈ X of X is known, she will receive a—possibly negative—reward f (x)
in some linear utility scale. Even more so, she prefers these desirable gambles over the status quo,
that is, over not conducting any transaction at all. A set of desirable gambles is called coherent if it
satisfies the following rationality requirements.
Definition 6 A coherent set of desirable gambles D on X is a subset of G (X ) such that, for any
two gambles f ,g ∈ G (X ) and any positive real number λ ∈ R>0:
D1: if f ≥ 0 and f 6= 0, then f ∈D;
D2: if f ∈D then λ f ∈D;
D3: if f ,g ∈D , then f +g ∈D;
D4: if f ≤ 0, then f /∈D .
The first axiom states that the possibility of a positive reward without risking a negative reward
should always be desirable, whereas the fourth axiom states that gambles that offer no positive re-
wards should never be desirable. The other two axioms are immediate consequences of the linearity
of the utility scale. Despite their simplicity, sets of desirable gambles offer a surprisingly powerful
framework for modelling uncertainty; see for example (Walley, 2000) and (Quaeghebeur, 2014).
For our present purposes though, all we need for now is Definition 6.
Conditional lower previsions also model a subject’s uncertainty about X by considering her
attitude towards gambles on X . However, in this case, instead of considering sets of gambles, we
consider the prices at which a subject is willing to buy these gambles. Let
C (X ) := G (X )×P /0(X )
be the set of all pairs ( f ,B), where f is a gamble on X and B is a non-empty subset of X —an
event. A conditional lower prevision is then defined as follows.
Definition 7 A conditional lower prevision P on C ⊆ C (X ) is a map
P : C → R : ( f ,B)→ P( f |B).
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For any ( f ,B) in the domain C , the lower prevision P( f |B) of f conditional on B is interpreted as a
subject’s supremum price µ for buying f , under the condition that the transaction is called off when
B does not happen—if x /∈ B. In other words, P( f |B) is the supremum value of µ for which she
is willing to engage in a transaction where she receives f (x)− µ if x ∈ B and zero otherwise, and
furthermore prefers this transaction to the status quo. If B = X , we adopt the shorthand notation
P( f ) := P( f |X ) and then call P( f ) the lower prevision of f . If B= X for all ( f ,B) ∈ C , meaning
that there is some G ⊆ G (X ) such that C = {( f ,X ) : f ∈ G }, this convention allows us to regard
P as an operator on G , and we then say that P is a lower prevision. In this sense, lower previsions
are a special case of conditional lower previsions.
It is also possible to consider conditional upper previsions P( f |B), which are interpreted as
infimum selling prices. However, since selling f for µ is equivalent to buying − f for −µ , we have
that P( f |B) =−P(− f |B). For that reason, we will mainly focus on conditional lower previsions. A
similar remark applies to (unconditional) upper previsions.
Because of their interpretation in terms of buying prices for gambles, a particularly intuitive
way to obtain a conditional lower prevision P is to derive it from a set of gambles D . Specifically,
for every D ⊆ G (X ), we let
PD ( f |B) := sup{µ ∈R : [ f −µ ]IB ∈D} for all ( f ,B) ∈ C (X ). (3)
A conditional lower prevision is then called coherent if can be derived from a coherent set of desir-
able gambles in this way.
Definition 8 A conditional lower prevision P on a domain C ⊆ C (X ) is coherent if there is a
coherent set of desirable gambles D on X such that P coincides with PD on C .
This definition of coherence is heavily inspired by the work of Williams (1975, 2007). The
only two minor differences are that our rationality axioms on D are slightly different from his—for
example, he allows for D to include the zero gamble—and that we do not impose any structure on
the domain C . Nevertheless, when the domain C satisfies the structural constraints in (Williams,
2007), Definition 8 is equivalent to that of Williams. More generally, as the following result es-
tablishes, it is equivalent to the structure-free notion of Williams-coherence that was developed by
Pelessoni and Vicig (2009).
Proposition 9 A conditional lower prevision P on C ⊆ C (X ) is coherent if and only if it is real-
valued and, for all n ∈ N0 and all choices of λ0, . . . ,λn ∈ R≥0 and ( f0,B0), . . . ,( fn,Bn) ∈ C :
sup
x∈B
( n
∑
i=1
λiIBi(x)[ fi(x)−P( fi|Bi)]−λ0IB0(x)[ f0(x)−P( f0|B0)]
)
≥ 0, (4)
where we let B := ∪ni=0Bi.
The advantage of this alternative characterisation is that it is expressed directly in terms of lower
previsions. Nevertheless, we consider Equation (4) to be less intuitive than Definition 8, which is
why we prefer the latter.
From a mathematical point of view, Definition 8 also has the advantage that it allows for simple
and elegant proofs of some well-known results. For example, it follows trivially from our definition
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of coherence that the domain of a coherent conditional lower prevision can be arbitrarily extended
while preserving coherence, whereas deriving this result directly from Equation (4) is substantially
more involved; see for example the proof of (Pelessoni and Vicig, 2009, Proposition 1). Further-
more, our definition also allows for a very natural derivation of the so-called natural extension of
P, that is, the most conservative extension of P to C (X ). In particular, instead of having to derive
this natural extension directly, Definition 8 allows us to rephrase this problem into a closely related
yet simpler question: what is the smallest coherent set of desirable gambles D on X such that PD
coincides with P on C ? The answer turns out to be surprisingly simple.
Proposition 10 Consider a coherent conditional lower prevision P on C ⊆ C (X ) and let
AP :=
{
[ f −µ ]IB : ( f ,B) ∈ C ,µ < P( f |B)
}
and E (P) := E (AP). (5)
Then E (P) is a coherent set of desirable gambles on X and PE (P) coincides with P on C . Further-
more, for any other coherent set of desirable gambles D on X such that PD coincides with P on
C , we have that E (P)⊆D .
Abstracting away some technical details, the reason why this result holds should be intuitively
clear. First, since conditional lower previsions are interpreted as called-off supremum buying prices,
we see that the gambles in AP should be desirable. Combined with D1–D3, the desirability of the
gambles in E (P) then follows.
Since smaller sets of desirable gambles lead to more conservative—pointwise smaller—lower
previsions, we conclude that the natural extension of P is given by
E( f |B) := PE (P)( f |B) for all ( f ,B) ∈ C (X ). (6)
The following proposition provides a formal statement of this result.
Proposition 11 Let P be a coherent conditional lower prevision on C ⊆C (X ). Then E, as defined
by Equation (6), is the pointwise smallest coherent conditional lower prevision on C (X ) that
coincides with P on C .
All in all, we conclude that Definition 8 provides an intuitive as well as mathematically conve-
nient characterisation of Williams-coherence that is furthermore equivalent to the structure-free ver-
sion of Pelessoni and Vicig (2009). From a technical point of view, this equivalence will not be es-
sential further on, because most of our arguments will be based on the connection with sets of desir-
able gambles. From a practical point of view though, this equivalence is highly important, because
the Williams-coherent conditional lower previsions that are considered in (Pelessoni and Vicig,
2009) are well-known to include as special cases a variety of other uncertainty models, including
expectations, lower expectations, probabilities and lower probabilities. For that reason, our results
can be applied to—and interpreted in terms of—these special cases as well. A detailed discussion
of this point is deferred to Sections 8 and 9; for now, we focus on sets of desirable gambles and
conditional lower previsions. We end this section by listing some well-known properties of the lat-
ter; see for example Pelessoni and Vicig (2009), Williams (2007) and Walley (1991). Proofs—or
explicit references to proofs—can be found in Appendix A.2.
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Proposition 12 Let P be a coherent conditional lower prevision on C ⊆ C (X ). Then for any two
gambles f ,g ∈ G (X ), any two events A,B ∈P /0(X ), any real number λ ∈ R and any sequence
of gambles { fn}n∈N ⊆ G (X ), whenever the involved conditional lower and upper previsions are
well-defined—that is, if the arguments belong to their domain—we have that
LP1: P( f |B)≥ infx∈B f (x) [boundedness]
LP2: P(λ f |B) = λP( f |B) if λ ≥ 0 [non-negative homogeneity]
LP3: P( f +g|B)≥ P( f |B)+P(g|B) [superadditivity]
LP4: P(IB[ f −P( f |A∩B)]|A) = 0 if A∩B 6= /0 [generalised Bayes rule]
LP5: limn→+∞ sup | f − fn|= 0⇒ limn→+∞P( fn|B) = P( f |B) [uniform continuity]
LP6: P( f +λ |B) = P( f |B)+λ [constant additivity]
LP7: f (x) ≥ g(x) for all x ∈ B⇒ P( f |B)≥ P(g|B) [monotonicity]
LP8: P( f |B)≤−P(− f |B) = P( f |B)
Proposition 13 Consider a set of events B ⊆ P /0(X ) that is closed under finite unions and let
F ⊆ G (X ) be a linear space of gambles such that IB f ∈ F and IB ∈ F for every f ∈ F and
B ∈ B. Now let C := {( f ,B) : f ∈ F ,B ∈ B}. Then a conditional lower prevision P on C is
coherent if and only if it is real-valued and satisfies LP1–LP4.
Corollary 14 A conditional lower prevision P on C (X ) is coherent if and only if it is real-valued
and satisfies LP1–LP4.
Corollary 15 Consider a linear space of gambles G ⊆ G (X ) that includes the constant gamble 1.
A lower prevision P on G is then coherent if and only if it is real-valued and satisfies LP1–LP3.
4. Epistemic Independence
Having introduced our main tools for modelling uncertainty, the next step towards developing a
notion of independent natural extension is to agree on what we mean by independence.
The approach that we adopt here is to define it as an assessment of mutual irrelevance. In
particular, we say that X1 and X2 are independent if our uncertainty model for X1 is not affected by
conditioning on information about X2, and vice versa. As we will see in Section 9, this definition can
be applied to a probability measure, and then yields the usual notion of independence. However,
and that is what makes this approach powerful and intuitive, it can just as easily be applied to
lower previsions, sets of desirable gambles, or any other type of uncertainty model. This type
of independence is usually referred to as epistemic independence. The aim of this section is to
formalize this concept for the case of two variables, in terms of sets of desirable gambles and
conditional lower previsions.
Consider two variables X1 and X2 where, for every i ∈ {1,2}, Xi takes values xi in a non-empty
set Xi that may be uncountably infinite. We assume that X1 and X2 are logically independent, mean-
ing that X1 = x1 and X2 = x2 are jointly possible, for all x1 ∈X1 and x2 ∈X2. The corresponding
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joint variable X := (X1,X2) therefore takes values x := (x1,x2) in X1×X2. In this context, when-
ever convenient, we will identify B1 ∈P /0(X1) with B1×X2 and B2 ∈P /0(X2) with X1×B2. For
any two events B1 ∈P /0(X1) and B2 ∈P /0(X2), this allows us to use B1∩B2 as an intuitive alter-
native notation for B1×B2. Similarly, for any i ∈ {1,2}, we identify f ∈ G (Xi) with its cylindrical
extension to G (X1×X2), defined by
f (x1,x2) := f (xi) for all x= (x1,x2) ∈X1×X2.
In order to make this explicit, we will then often denote this cylindrical extension by f (Xi). In this
way, for example, for any f ∈ G (X2) and B∈P(X1), we can write f (X2)IB(X1) to denote a gamble
in G (X1×X2)whose value in (x1,x2) is equal to f (x2) if x1 ∈B and equal to zero otherwise. Using
these conventions, for any set of gambles D on X1×X2, we define the marginal models
marg1(D) := { f ∈ G (X1) : f (X1) ∈D} and marg2(D) := { f ∈ G (X2) : f (X2) ∈D}
and, for any events B1 ∈P /0(X1) and B2 ∈P /0(X2), the conditional models
marg1(D |B2) := { f ∈ G (X1) : f (X1)IB2(X2) ∈D}
and
marg2(D |B1) := { f ∈ G (X2) : f (X2)IB1(X1) ∈D}.
Conditioning and marginalisation both preserve coherence: if D is a coherent set of desirable gam-
bles on X1×X2, then marg1(D) and marg1(D |B2) are coherent sets of desirable gambles on X1,
and marg2(D) and marg2(D |B1) are coherent sets of desirable gambles on X2.
That said, let us now recall our informal definition of epistemic independence, which was that
the uncertainty model for X1 is not affected by conditioning on information about X2, and vice versa.
In the context of sets of desirable gambles, this can now be formalized as follows:
marg1(D |B2) =marg1(D) and marg2(D |B1) =marg2(D).
The only thing that is left to specify are the conditioning events B1 and B2 for which we want this
condition to hold. We think that the most intuitive approach is to impose this for every B1 ∈P /0(X1)
and B2 ∈ P /0(X2), and will call this epistemic event-independence. However, this is not what is
usually done. The conventional approach, which we will refer to as epistemic atom-independence,
is to focus on singleton events of the type B1 = {x1} and B2 = {x2}; see for example (Walley, 1991)
and (de Cooman and Miranda, 2012).1
The main reason why epistemic atom-independence is the conventional go-to definition for
epistemic independence is that Walley adopted it in his seminal book (Walley, 1991, Section 9.2).
Walley seems to take this choice for granted; we assume that this is a consequence of his focus on
conditional lower previsions whose conditioning events belong to a (finite number of) partition(s).
The advantage of using such a partition—and a set of atoms in particular—is that it can be regarded
1. Readers that are familiar with some of my previous work (De Bock, 2015, 2017) may notice that I have changed
terminology: what I now call epistemic event- and atom-independence, I previously referred to as epistemic subset-
and value-independence. This new terminology was suggested to me by an anonymous reviewer, and I could not but
agree that it indeed better reflects the meaning of the respective concepts.
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as representing the possible outcomes of an experiment, allowing for a quite natural study of statis-
tical inference and updating. Partitions are also essential if one wiches to impose the controversial
property of conglomerability (Miranda and Zaffalon, 2013). Nevertheless, we consider this focus
on partitions—which is inherent in Walley’s approach—to be overly restrictive; we prefer having
the option to condition on any possible event, especially since one can always zoom in on a partic-
ular partition whenever needed or convenient. This serves as a first reason why we prefer epistemic
event-independence over epistemic atom-independence.
Other than that, as we will see further on, epistemic event-independence also has several tech-
nical advantages; in fact, this will be one of the main conclusions of this contribution. For now,
however, we postpone this debate between event- and atom-independence by adopting a very gen-
eral approach that subsumes the former two as special cases. In particular, for every i ∈ {1,2},
we simply fix a generic set of conditioning events Bi ⊆ P /0(Xi). Epistemic atom-independence
corresponds to choosing Bi = Xi, whereas epistemic event-independence corresponds to choosing
Bi = P /0(Xi).
For sets of desirable gambles, this leads us to the following definition.
Definition 16 Let D be a coherent set of desirable gambles on X1×X2. Then D is epistemically
independent if, for any i and j such that {i, j} = {1,2}:
margi(D |B j) =margi(D) for all B j ∈B j.
For coherent lower previsions, as a prerequisite for defining epistemic independence, we require
that the domain C ⊆ C (X1×X2) is independent, by which we mean that for any i and j such that
{i, j} = {1,2}, any pair ( fi,Bi) ∈ C (Xi) and any event B j ∈B j:
( fi,Bi) ∈ C ⇔ ( fi,Bi∩B j) ∈ C . (7)
Other than that, we impose no restrictions on C ; its elements ( f ,B) ∈ C are for example not re-
stricted to the types that appear in Equation (7). As a result, the following definition of epistemic
independence is applicable beyond the context of lower previsions. For example, by restricting the
domain to indicators, we obtain a notion of epistemic independence that applies to conditional lower
probabilities. A detailed discussion of these special cases, however, is deferred to Section 8.
Definition 17 Let C ⊆ C (X1×X2) be an independent domain. A coherent conditional lower
prevision P on C is then epistemically independent if, for any i and j such that {i, j} = {1,2}:
P( fi|Bi) = P( fi|Bi∩B j) for all ( fi,Bi) ∈ C (Xi)∩C and B j ∈B j.
Another important feature of this definition is that B j is not only irrelevant to the unconditional
lower previsions of local gambles fi—in the sense that P( fi) = P( fi|B j)—but also to their con-
ditional local lower previsions—in the sense that P( fi|Bi) = P( fi|Bi ∩ B j). This type of irrele-
vance is called h-irrelevance; see Cozman (2013) and De Bock (2015). Note however that this
feature is optional within our framework; it only appears when C is sufficiently large. If instead
Bi = Xi for all ( fi,Bi) ∈ C (Xi)∩C , then our definition reduces to the more simple requirement
that P( fi) = P( fi|B j). The following example illustrates this subtle feature and also demonstrates
the difference between epistemic atom- and event-independence.
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Example 4 Let X1 = R and X2 = N and consider any coherent conditional lower prevision P
on C ⊆ C (X1×X2) that is epistemically independent, with C an independent domain. For any
( f1,B1)∈C (X1)∩C and B2 ∈B2, it then follows from Definition 17 that P( f1|B1)=P( f1|B1∩B2).
To make this more concrete, we now consider several examples.
We first consider the most powerful case, where the domain C is equal to C (X1×X2)—the
largest possible domain—and where the type of independence that is considered is event-independence.
Now let f1 := sin(X1) and let B2 := {2n : n ∈ N} be the event that X2 is even. For B1 = X1, we then
find that P(sin(X1)) = P(sin(X1)|X2 even), meaning that conditioning on the event that X2 is even
has no effect on the lower prevision of sin(X1). In much the same way, for B1 = R≥0, we find that
P(sin(X1)|X1 ≥ 0) = P(sin(X1)|X1 ≥ 0 and X2 even), which means that the conditional lower pre-
vision of sin(X1) given X1 ≥ 0 does not change if we additionally condition on the event that X2 is
even. This second example provides a nice illustration of the fact that our definition of independence
imposes mutual h-irrelevance rather than mutual irrelevance.
If we shrink the domain C sufficiently, to the extent that every ( f1,B1) ∈ C (X1)∩C is of
the form ( f1,X1), then the added value of h-irrelevance disappears because our definition then
only imposes assessments of the type P( f1) = P( f1|B2), such as, for example, the assessement
P(sin(X1)) = P(sin(X1)|X2 even) that we have seen before.
The effect of replacing event-independence with atom-independence is also quite substantial.
In particular, since B2 then changes from P /0(N) to N, we can then no longer condition on the
event B2 := {2n : n ∈ N} that X2 is even, because that event is not a singleton. Instead, for atom-
indepence, we can only condition on events B2 of the form {x2}, such as, for example, the assesse-
ment P(sin(X1)) = P(sin(X1)|X2 = 5). ♦
5. The Independent Natural Extension
All of that said, we are now finally ready to introduce our central object of interest, which is the
independent natural extension. Basically, the question to which this concept provides an answer is:
given two local uncertainty models and an assessment of epistemic independence, what then should
be the corresponding joint model? The answer depends on the specific framework that is being
considered.
Within the framework of sets of desirable gambles, the local uncertainty models are coherent
sets of desirable gambles. In particular, for each i ∈ {1,2}, we are given a coherent set of desirable
gambles Di on Xi. The aim is to combine these local models with an assessment of epistemic
independence to obtain a coherent set of desirable gambles D on X1×X2. The first requirement
on D , therefore, is that it should have D1 and D2 as its marginals, in the sense that margi(D) = Di
for all i ∈ {1,2}. The second is that D should be epistemically independent. If both requirements
are met, D is called an independent product of D1 and D2. The most conservative among these
independent products is called the independent natural extension.
Definition 18 An independent product of D1 and D2 is an epistemically independent coherent set
of desirable gambles D on X1×X2 that has D1 and D2 as its marginals.
Definition 19 The independent natural extension of D1 and D2 is the smallest independent product
of D1 and D2.
If all we know is that D is epistemically independent and has D1 and D2 as its marginal models,
then the safest choice for D—the only choice that does not require any additional assessments—is
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their independent natural extension, provided of course that it exists. In order to show that it always
does, we let
D1⊗D2 := E (A1→2∪A2→1) , (8)
with
A1→2 := { f2(X2)IB1(X1) : f2 ∈D2,B1 ∈B1∪{X1}} (9)
and
A2→1 := { f1(X1)IB2(X2) : f1 ∈D1,B2 ∈B2∪{X2}} . (10)
The following result establishes that D1⊗D2 is the independent natural extension of D1 and D2.
Theorem 20 D1⊗D2 is the independent natural extension of D1 and D2.
Similar concepts can be defined for conditional lower previsions as well. In that case, the local
uncertainty models are coherent conditional lower previsions. In particular, for every i ∈ {1,2},
we are given a coherent conditional lower prevision Pi on some freely chosen local domain Ci ⊆
C (Xi). Note that this freedom implies that Pi can also be an unconditional; this corresponds to
choosing Ci := {( fi,Xi) : fi ∈ Gi} for some Gi ⊆ G (Xi). In any case, the aim is now to construct
an epistemically independent coherent conditional lower prevision P on C ⊆ C (X1×X2) that has
P1 and P2 as its marginals, in the sense that P coincides with P1 and P2 on their local domain:
P( fi|Bi) = Pi( fi|Bi) for all i∈ {1,2} and ( fi,Bi)∈ Ci. As before, a model that meets these criteria is
then called an independent product, and the most conservative among them is called the independent
natural extension. Clearly, in order for these notions to make sense, the global domain C must at
least include the local domains C1 and C2 and must furthermore be independent in the sense of
Equation (7). The definitions and results below take this for granted.
Definition 21 An independent product of P1 and P2 is an epistemically independent coherent con-
ditional lower prevision on C that has P1 and P2 as its marginals.
Definition 22 The independent natural extension of P1 and P2 is the point-wise smallest indepen-
dent product of P1 and P2.
Here too, if all we know is that P is epistemically independent and has P1 and P2 as its
marginal models, then the safest choice for P—the only choice that does not require any addi-
tional assessments—is the independent natural extension, provided that it exists. The following
result establishes that it does, by showing that it is a restriction of the operator P1⊗P2, defined by
(P1⊗P2)( f |B) := PD ( f |B) for all ( f ,B) ∈ C (X1×X2), with D = E (P1)⊗E (P2). (11)
Theorem 23 The independent natural extension of P1 and P2 is the restriction of P1⊗P2 to C .
Interestingly, as can be seen from this result, the choice of the joint domain C does not affect the
resulting independent natural extension, in the sense that any C that includes ( f ,B) will lead to the
same value of (P1⊗P2)( f |B). For that reason, we will henceforth assume without loss of generality
that C = C (X1×X2).
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6. On the Choice of Conditioning Events
The fact that the existence results in the previous section are valid regardless of the choice of B1
and B2 should not be taken to mean that this choice does not affect the model. In some cases, it
most definitely does. In the remainder of this contribution, we will study the extent to which it does,
and how it affects the properties of the resulting notion of independent natural extension.
As a first observation, we note that larger sets of conditioning events correspond to stronger
assessments of epistemic independence, and therefore lead to more informative joint models. For
example, as can be seen from Equations (8)–(10), adding events to B1 and B2 leads to a larger—
more informative—set of desirable gambles D1⊗D2. Similarly, as can be seen from Equation (11),
it leads to a joint lower prevision that is higher—and therefore again more informative. There is
one important exception to this observation though, which occurs when we add conditioning events
that are a finite disjoint union of other conditioning events. In that case, the resulting notion of
independent natural extension does not change.
Proposition 24 For each i ∈ {1,2}, let B′i be a superset of Bi that consists of finite disjoint unions
of events in Bi. Replacing B1 by B
′
1 and B2 by B
′
2 then has no effect on the resulting independent
natural extension D1⊗D2 or P1⊗P2.
As a particular case of this result, it follows that if Bi is a finite partition of Xi, we can replace
it by the generated algebra—minus the empty event. As an even more particular case, if X1 and
X2 are finite, we find that epistemic atom- and event-independence lead to the same notion of
independent natural extension. For that reason, in the finite case, it does not really matter which of
these two types of epistemic independence is adopted.
In the infinite case though, we will see that the difference does matter, which requires one to
choose between epistemic atom- and event-independence. For lower previsions, Miranda and Zaffalon
(2015) recently adopted epistemic atom-independence in combination with Walley-coherence. Un-
fortunately, they found that the corresponding notion of independent natural extension does not al-
ways exist. They also considered the combination of epistemic atom-independence with Williams-
coherence, and argued that the resulting model was too weak. For the case of lower probabili-
ties, Vicig (2000) adopted epistemic event-independence in combination with Williams-coherence,
showed that the corresponding independent natural extension always exists, and proved that it sat-
isfies factorisation properties. Our results so far can be regarded as a generalisation of the existence
results of Vicig (2000). As we are about to show, his factorisation results can be generalised as well.
7. Factorisation and External Additivity
When X1 and X2 are finite, the independent natural extension of two lower previsions P1 and P2
is well-known to satisfy the properties of factorisation and external additivity (de Cooman et al.,
2011). Factorisation, on the one hand, states that
(P1⊗P2)(gh) = P1(gP2(h)) =
{
P1(g)P2(h) if P2(h)≥ 0
P1(g)P2(h) if P2(h)≤ 0,
(12)
where g is a non-negative gamble onX1, h is a gamble onX2 and P1(g) :=−P1(−g). By symmetry,
the role of 1 and 2 can of course be reversed. External additivity, on the other hand, states that
(P1⊗P2)( f +h) = P1( f )+P2(h) (13)
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where f and h are gambles on X1 and X2, respectively.
Compared to the properties that are satisfied by the joint expectation of a product measure of
two probability measures, these notions of factorisation and external additivity are rather weak. For
example, for a product measure, additivity is not ‘external’, in the sense that f and h do not have to
be defined on separate variables, nor does factorisation require g to be non-negative. Nevertheless,
even in this weaker form, these properties remain of crucial practical importance. For example,
as explained in (de Cooman et al., 2011), factorisation properties such as Equation (12)—when ap-
plied to more than two variables—are sufficient in order to establish laws of large numbers for lower
previsions (de Cooman and Miranda, 2008). As another example, in the context of credal networks,
which are Bayesian networks whose local models are partially specified, properties such as Equa-
tions (12) and (13) turned out to be the key to the development of efficient inference algorithms;
see for example (de Cooman et al., 2010), (De Bock and de Cooman, 2014) and (De Bock, 2015).
Any notion of independent natural extension that aims to extend such algorithms to infinite spaces,
therefore, should preserve some suitable version of Equations (12) and (13).
The aim of this section is to study the extent to which these equations are satisfied by the notion
of independent natural extension that was developed in this paper. As we will see, the answer ends
up being surprisingly positive.
For all i ∈ {1,2}, let Pi be a coherent conditional lower prevision on Ci ⊆ C (Xi), let E i be its
natural extension to C (Xi), and let Bi be a subset of P /0(Xi). The independent natural extension
of P1 and P2 then satisfies the following three properties, the first of which implies the other two as
special cases.
Theorem 25 Let {i, j}= {1,2}. For any f ∈ G (Xi), h ∈ G (X j) and Bi-measurable g ∈ G≥0(Xi),
we then have that
(P1⊗P2)( f +gh) = E i
(
f +gE j(h)
)
.
Corollary 26 (Factorisation) Let {i, j} = {1,2}. For any h ∈ G (X j) and any g ∈ G≥0(Xi) that is
Bi-measurable, we then have that
(P1⊗P2)(gh) = E i
(
gE j(h)
)
=
{
E i(g)E j(h) if E j(h) ≥ 0;
E i(g)E j(h) if E j(h) ≤ 0.
Corollary 27 (External additivity) For any f ∈ G (X1) and h ∈ G (X2), we have that
(P1⊗P2)( f +h) = E1( f )+E2(h).
In each of these results, if the local domains C1 and C2 are sufficiently large—that is, if they include
the gambles that appear in the statement of the results—it follows from Proposition 11 that E i and
E j can be replaced by Pi and P j, respectively, and similarly for E i and Pi.
That said, let us now go back to the question of whether or not Equations (12) and (13) can
be generalised to the case of infinite spaces. For the case of external additivity, it clearly follows
from Corollary 27 that the answer is fully positive. Furthermore, this conclusion holds regardless
of our choice for B1 and B2; they can even be empty. For factorisation, the answer does depend
on B1 and B2. If we adopt epistemic event-independence—that is, if we choose B1 = P /0(X1)
and B2 = P /0(X2)—it follows from Corollaries 5 and 26 that the answer is again fully positive,
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because P /0(Xi)-measurability then holds trivially. If B1∪{ /0} and B2∪{ /0} are sigma fields, the
answer remains fairly positive as well, because Proposition 3 then implies that it suffices for g to be
measurable in the usual, measure-theoretic sense.
Example 5 Let X1 = X2 = R and let B1 = B2 = B, with B = B
∗ \ { /0} and with B∗ the σ -
algebra of Lebesgue measurable subsets of R. Furthermore, let g ∈ G≥0(X1) be the indicator of
the nonnegative reals, defined for all x1 ∈ R by g(x1) := 1 if x1 ≥ 0 and g(x1) := 0 otherwise, and
let h ∈ G (X2) be defined by h(x2) := x
3
2 for all x2 ∈ R. We then know from Example 3 that g and h
are both Lebesgue-measurable and therefore also B-measurable. Therefore, for any two coherent
conditional lower previsions P1 on C (X1) and P2 on C (X2), Corollary 26 implies that
(P1⊗P2)(gh) =
{
P1(g)P2(h) if P2(h) ≥ 0;
P1(g)P2(h) if P2(h) ≤ 0.
♦
However, these positive conclusions do not apply if we adopt epistemic atom-independence—
that is, if we choose B1 = X1 and B2 = X2—because our factorisation result then requires g to be
Xi-measurable, which, as we know from Example 2, is a rather strong requirement that easily fails.
Nevertheless, the factorisation properties that do hold for atom-independence are stronger than what
is suggested in Miranda and Zaffalon (2015). In order to illustrate this, we consider the following
adaptation of their Example 4.
Example 6 Let X1 = X2 = N and let P1 and P2 be coherent lower previsions on G (X1) and
G (X2), respectively. Let g ∈ G≥0(X1) and h ∈ G≥0(X2) be defined by g(x1) := 1/x1 and h(x2) :
= 1/x2 for all x1 ∈ X1 and x2 ∈ X2. We then know from Example 1 that the gambles g and h
are both P /0(N)-measurable and N-measurable. Furthermore, since g and h are nonnegative, LP1
implies that P1(g) ≥ 0 and P2(h) ≥ 0. Hence, regardless of whether we adopt epistemic event- or
atom-independence, we can apply Corollary 26 to find that (P1⊗P2)(gh) = P1(g)P2(h). ♦
For readers that are familiar with the work of Miranda and Zaffalon (2015), the final conclusion
of this example may seem surprising at first, because in their Example 4, Miranda and Zaffalon
show that for the same two gambles g and h, for atom-independence and Williams-coherence, the
independent natural extension assigns lower prevision zero to gh, regardless of the chosen local
models P1 and P2. In contrast, our example above concludes that this lower prevision is equal to the
product of P1(g) and P2(h). This apparent contradiction is a consequence of the fact that Miranda
and Zaffalon do not require the independent natural extension of P1 and P2 to have P1 and P2 as its
marginals. Instead—using their notation and terminology—they only require weak coherence with
P1(·|X2) and P2(·|X1); see (Miranda and Zaffalon, 2015) for more information. As we can see here,
this leads to a notion of independent natural extension that satisfies fewer factorisation properties.
Our Definitions 21 and 22 avoid this, by explicitly imposing that the independent natural extension
of P1 and P2 should have P1 and P2 as its marginals.
Still, even with our strengthened definition, the issue remains that for atom-independence, our
factorisation result requires the stringent assumption that g is Xi-measurable. This issue is funda-
mental because, as our next example demonstrates, it is not just a feature of Corollary 26 but rather
an inherent property of atom-independence: epistemic atom-independence indeed leads to weaker
factorisation properties.
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Example 7 Let X1 = X2 = N and let g = Iodd ∈ G≥0(X1) and h = Ieven ∈ G≥0(X2), with Iodd
and Ieven defined as in Example 2. Furthermore, let P1 be a coherent lower prevision on G (X1)
and let P2 be a coherent lower prevision on G (X2). Since g and h are nonnegative, LP1 then
implies that P1(g) ≥ 0 and P2(h) ≥ 0. Therefore, and because we know from Example 2 that
g and h are P /0(N)-measurable, we can apply Corollary 26 to find that for event-independence:
(P1⊗P2)(gh) = P1(g)P2(h). However, unfortunately, this corollary cannot be applied for atom-
independence, because we know from Example 2 that g and h are not N-measurable.
Of course, one could still believe that factorisation can be established in some other way, and
that it is simply Corollary 26 that is lacking in power, rather than the concept of atom-independence
itself. This is however not the case: for atom-independence, as we will demonstrate in Example 8,
(P1⊗P2)(Iodd(X1)Ieven(X2)) can be strictly smaller than P1(Iodd(X1))P2(Ieven(X2)) ♦
Because of these weak factorisation properties, we think that for the case of infinite spaces,
when it comes to choosing between epistemic atom- and event-independence, the latter should be
preferred over the former. That is not the only reason though. There is also a second, closely related
reason, which is that event-independence leads to much more informative inferences. However, in
order to explain and demonstrate that, we first need to establish a connection between conditional
lower previsions, probabilities and expectations, which is what we now set out to do.
8. Connecting lower previsions with expectations and probabilities
The key to understanding the connection between lower previsions, expectations and probabilities is
to consider conditional lower previsions that are self-conjugate, in the sense that they coincide with
their corresponding upper prevision. In that case, we simply refer to them as conditional previsions
and denote them by P instead of P.
Definition 28 (Conditional prevision) A conditional prevision P on C ⊆ C (X ) is a conditional
lower prevision on C that is self-conjugate, in the sense that
(− f ,B) ∈ C and P( f |B) =−P(− f |B) for all ( f ,B) ∈ C . (14)
Unconditional previsions correspond to a special case. First, if B = X , then similarly to what
we did for conditional lower previsions, we adopt the shorthand notation P( f ) := P( f |X ) and call
P( f ) the prevision of f . Second, if B=X for all ( f ,B)∈C , meaning that there is some G ⊆ G (X )
such that C = {( f ,X ) : f ∈ G }, we regard P as an operator on G and then call P a(n unconditional)
prevision.
If a conditional prevision is coherent, we refer to it as a conditional linear prevision. Similarly,
coherent (unconditional) previsions are called linear previsions.
Definition 29 (Conditional linear prevision) A conditional linear prevision P on C ⊆ C (X ) is a
coherent conditional prevision on C .
The reason for this terminology, quite obviously, is that conditional linear previsions can be
shown to be linear operators. In fact, they satisfy various other convenient properties as well, which,
for the sake of completeness, are listed below.
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Proposition 30 Let P be a conditional linear prevision on C ⊆ C (X ). Then for any two gambles
f ,g ∈ G (X ), any two events A,B ∈P /0(X ), any real number λ ∈ R and any sequence of gambles
{ fn}n∈N ⊆ G (X ), whenever the involved conditional previsions are well-defined—that is, if the
arguments belong to their domain—we have that
P1: P( f |B)≥ infx∈B f (x) [boundedness]
P2: P(λ f |B) = λP( f |B) [homogeneity]
P3: P( f +g|B) = P( f |B)+P(g|B) [additivity]
P4: P(IB f |A) = P( f |A∩B)P(B|A) if A∩B 6= /0 [Bayes rule]
P5: limn→+∞ sup | f − fn|= 0⇒ limn→+∞P( fn|B) = P( f |B) [uniform continuity]
P6: P( f +λ |B) = P( f |B)+λ [constant additivity]
P7: f (x) ≥ g(x) for all x ∈ B⇒ P( f |B)≥ P(g|B) [monotonicity]
Proposition 31 Consider a set of events B ⊆ P /0(X ) that is closed under finite unions and let
F ⊆ G (X ) be a linear space of gambles such that IB f ∈ F and IB ∈ F for every f ∈ F and
B∈B. Now let C := {( f ,B) : f ∈F ,B ∈B}. Then a conditional prevision P on C is a conditional
linear prevision on C if and only if it is real-valued and satisfies P1–P4.
Corollary 32 A conditional prevision P on C (X ) is linear if and only if it is real-valued and
satisfies P1–P4.
Corollary 33 Consider a linear space of gambles G ⊆ G (X ) that includes the constant gamble 1.
A prevision P on G is then linear if and only if it is real-valued and satisfies P1–P3.
By comparing these properties with the ones in Section 3, we see that the linearity of conditional
linear previsions—the fact that they satisfy P2 and P3—is their most important property, in the
sense that it distinguishes them from general coherent conditional lower previsions. Furthermore,
this property is also what allows us to establish a connection with expectations. In particular, if we
allow ourselves a small leap of faith here, then since expectations are well known to be linear, the
fact that conditional linear previsions are also linear suggests that we can simply interpret them as
conditional expectations.
In order to clarify why this is more than just intuition, it is instrumental to restrict the domain
of P to elements that are of the form (IA,B), where IA is the indicator of an event A, and to then
follow de Finetti (1970) in adopting the alternative notation P(A|B) := P(IA|B). As this notation
already suggests, P(A|B) can then be interpreted as the probability of A conditional on B. This
interpretation is furthermore mathematically sound, because the obtained objects P(A|B) can be
shown to satisfy all the essential properties of conditional probabilities, including finite—but not
necessarily countable—additivity and, if B 6= /0, Bayes’s rule. Hence, by restricting the domain of
a conditional linear prevision P to elements of the form (IA,B), we obtain a conditional probability
measure. The original unrestricted conditional linear prevision P is then the conditional expectation
operator that corresponds to this conditional probability measure. Here too, this connection is not
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merely intuitive, but can be made mathematically rigorous. A detailed account of the mathematics
behind these connections, however, is beyond the scope of this contribution. For more information
about (finitely additive) conditional probability measures, the interested reader is referred to the
work of Dubins (1975).
For our present purposes, it suffices to know that conditional linear previsions can indeed be
interpreted as conditional expectation operators and that conditional probabilities are conditional
linear previsions whose domain contains only—or is restricted to—elements of the form (IA,B). A
similar observation applies to unconditional expectation operators and probability measures, with
the role of the conditional linear prevision now taken up by an unconditional one.
Since conditional linear previsions are themselves a special (self-conjugate) case of coherent
conditional lower previsions, we conclude that conditional expectations and conditional probability
measures can both be regarded as special cases of conditional coherent lower previsions. Similarly,
unconditional expectations and probability measures are special cases of coherent lower previsions.
However, the connection goes much further, because conditional linear previsions are not just a
special case of coherent conditional lower previsions: they can also be used to characterise them.
Proposition 34 A conditional lower prevision P on C ⊆ C (X ) is coherent if and only if there is a
non-empty set P∗ of conditional linear previsions on C (X ) such that
P( f |B) = inf{P( f |B) : P ∈ P∗} for all ( f ,B) ∈ C . (15)
The same is true if the infimum in this expression is replaced by a minimum.
This well-known result is essentially due to Williams (1975, 2007); our proof is a minor vari-
ation of his. The result is fundamental, because it provides coherent conditional lower previsions
with a second, alternative interpretation. Indeed, because of Proposition 34, a conditional lower
prevision is not only a supreming buying price; alternatively, it can also be regarded as an infimum
of conditional previsions. Since—as we have just seen—conditional previsions can themselves be
interpreted as conditional expectations, this implies that coherent conditional lower previsions can
be interpreted as lower envelopes of expectations, often referred to as lower expectations.
This interpretation can also be used to develop an alternative characterisation for the natural
extension E of a coherent conditional lower prevision P on C ⊆ C (X ). In order to do that, we let
P be the set of all conditional linear previsions on C (X ) and then let
PP := {P ∈ P : P( f |B)≥ P( f |B) for all ( f ,B) ∈ C } (16)
be the subset that dominates P. The natural extension E is then the lower envelope of PP and,
similarly, E is its upper envelope.
Proposition 35 Let P be a coherent conditional lower prevision P on C ⊆ C (X ), let E be its
natural extension to C (X ) and let E be the corresponding conditional upper prevision on C (X ).
Then PP 6= /0 and, for all ( f ,B) ∈ C (X ):
E( f |B) =min{P( f |B) : P ∈ PP} and E( f |B) =max{P( f |B) : P ∈ PP}. (17)
Also, for any ( f ,B)∈C (X ) and α ∈ [E( f |B),E( f |B)], there is some P∈ PP such that P( f |B) = α .
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The final connection that remains to be discussed is that between conditional lower previsions
and conditional lower probabilities. However, since conditional lower previsions are lower en-
velopes of conditional linear previsions, and since conditional probability measures are conditional
linear previsions whose domain is restricted to elements of the form (IA,B), this connection is im-
mediate: conditional lower probabilities are simply conditional lower previsions whose domain is
restricted to elements of the form (IA,B). In that case, in order to emphasize this, we adopt P(A|B)
as an intuitive alternative notation for P(IA|B).
9. Special cases of the independent natural extension
Now that we have established that expectations, lower expectations, probabilities and lower proba-
bilities are indeed all special cases of lower previsions, we can come back to our claim at the end of
Section 3, which was that our results can be applied to—and interpreted in terms of—these special
cases as well.
Applying our results to the case of lower expectations is straightforward. Mathematically, noth-
ing changes. The only difference is that the local conditional lower previsions that we start from are
now interpreted—or defined—as lower bounds on expectations, and similarly for the independent
natural extension that is derived from them. For lower probabilities, it suffices to restrict the domain
of the local models P1 and P2 to elements of the form (IA1 ,B1) and (IA2 ,B2), respectively, and to
similarly restrict the domain C of P1⊗P2 to elements of the form (IA,B). Other than that, here too,
the only difference is the interpretation. For results that are tailored to this specific case, we refer
the interested reader to the work of Vicig (2000), who focused on the independent natural extension
for lower probabilities, but within a more general context that allows for more than two variables.
As explained before, our results are basically a generalisation of his, extending them from lower
probabilities to conditional lower previsions.
Once we interpret the independent natural extension as a lower expectation or a lower proba-
bility, it makes sense to consider the set of conditional linear previsions PP1⊗P2 that dominates the
independent natural extension P1⊗P2, and to then interpret the latter in terms of the elements of the
former. An essential observation here is that the elements of PP1⊗P2 need not be independent them-
selves, nor is this the case for its extreme points. Consequently, the independent natural extension
is not in general a lower envelope of precise independent models (Walley, 1991, Section 9.3.4). For
example, for any f1 ∈ G (X1) and B2 ∈B2, since P1⊗P2 is an independent product of P1 and P2,
it follows from Definitions 21 and 17 that
(P1⊗P2)( f1|B2) = (P1⊗P2)( f1) = P1( f1).
However, for P ∈ PP1⊗P2 , this does not necessarily imply that P( f1|B2) = P( f1). Instead, the only
constraint that is imposed on P( f1|B2) and P( f1) is that they both belong to [P1( f1),P1( f1)]:
P1( f1)≤ P( f1|B2)≤ P1( f1) and P1( f1)≤ P( f1)≤ P1( f1).
This feature is an essential aspect of epistemic independence: it imposes independence on the un-
certainty model itself. If this uncertainty model is a set of conditional expectations, then epis-
temic independence imposes constraints on this set—in this case, on the resulting lower and upper
expectations—but not on the individual expectations themselves. Similarly, for lower probabilities,
epistemic independence does not require P(A1|B2) and P(A1) to be equal, but only requires that
P1(A1)≤ P(A1|B2)≤ P1(A1) and P1(A1)≤ P(A1)≤ P1(A1). (18)
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In this sense, epistemic independence requires that our knowledge about P(A1|B2) and P(A1) is
identical: conditioning on B2 should have no effect on our bounds for P(A1). This also explains the
prefix epistemic: epistemic independence imposes a constraint on our knowledge. In other words,
and at the risk of oversimplifying it, one could say that an assessment of epistemic independence
does not entail a belief of independence—because, for a given P ∈ PP1⊗P2 , X1 and X2 may very well
be correlated—but rather an independence of beliefs.
Nevertheless, the standard notion of independence does correspond to a special case of epistemic
independence: it suffices to use—restrictions of—two linear previsions P1 on G (X1) and P2 on
G (X2) as our local models. Indeed, in that case, since the linearity of P1 implies that P1(A1) =
P1(A1) = P1(A1), Equation (18) implies that for all P ∈PP1⊗P2:
P(A1|B2) = P(A1) for all A1 ∈P(X1) and B2 ∈B2,
and similarly if the indexes 1 and 2 are reversed. Furthermore, it then follows from Corollary 26
and Property P1 that P(A1∩B2) = P(A1)P(B2), which is the conventional and well known defining
factorisation property of independence.
We end by taking an even closer look at this specific case. So consider a linear prevision P1 on
G (X1) and a linear prevision P2 on G (X2) or—in case we want to consider probability measures
instead of expectations—their restrictions to a suitable set of indicators. Using the notation that
we have adopted so far, the independent natural extension of these local models is then denoted by
P1⊗P2. In this case however, this notation is a bit unfortunate, because it suggests that P1⊗P2 is
a (conditional) linear prevision itself, which, as we will see, may not be the case. Therefore, we
will adopt P1⊗P2 as an alternative—less suggestive—notation for P1⊗P2 and will then use P1⊗P2
to denote its corresponding conditional upper prevision, defined by
(P1⊗P2)( f |B) :=−(P1⊗P2)(− f |B) for all ( f ,B) ∈ C (X1×X2).
For atom-independence, the difference between (P1⊗P2)( f |B) and (P1⊗P2)( f |B) can be sur-
prisingly large. For example, if the local models assign probability zero to all the singletons, then
as already pointed out in the work of Miranda and Zaffalon (2015), any joint linear prevision that
marginalises to these local models will dominate the independent natural extension.
Proposition 36 Consider a linear prevision P1 on G (X1) and a linear prevision P2 on G (X2) such
that P1(Ix1) = 0 and P2(Ix2) = 0 for all x1 ∈ X1 and x2 ∈ X2. Let P12 be a linear prevision on
G (X1×X2) that has P1 and P2 as its marginals. For atom-independence, we then have that for all
f ∈ G (X1×X2):
(P1⊗P2)( f )≤ P12( f )≤ (P1⊗P2)( f ).
We now use this result to obtain the following example. It demonstrates that (P1⊗P2)( f |B) and
(P1⊗P2)( f |B)may be—substantially—different, and therefore, that PP1⊗P2 may have more than one
element. Furthermore, and perhaps most importantly, it proves the claim that we made at the end of
Example 7.
Example 8 Let X1 = X2 = N, and let g = Iodd ∈ G≥0(X1) and h = Ieven ∈ G≥0(X2), with Iodd
and Ieven defined as in Example 2. Consider now two linear previsions Podd and Peven on G (N) such
that Podd(In) = 0 and Peven(In) = 0 for all n ∈ N and such that Podd(Iodd) = 1 = Peven(Ieven), and
let P := 1/2(Podd+Peven). It then follows from Corollary 33 that P is a linear prevision on G (N).
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Furthermore, we find that P(In) = 1/2(Podd(In)+Peven(In)) = 0 for all n ∈ N and, in the same way,
that P(Iodd) = P(Ieven) = 1/2.
Now let P1 = P2 = P. Then as demonstrated in (Miranda and Zaffalon, 2015, Example 5), it
is possible to construct a linear prevision P12 on G (X1×X2) that has P1 and P2 as its marginals
and for which P12(X1 odd and X2 even) = P12(gh) = 0. Therefore, for atom-independence, Propo-
sition 36 implies that (P1⊗P2)(gh) ≤ 0. Since the converse inequality follows from Property P1
and the non-negativity of f g, this implies that for atom-independence, (P1⊗P2)(gh) = 0. Since
P1(g)P2(h) = P(Iodd)P(Ieven) = 1/2 · 1/2 = 1/4, this shows that atom-independence does not lead to
factorisation here, and proves our claim from Example 7.
For event-independence however, since linear previsions are a special case of coherent lower
previsions, we already know from Example 7 that we do have factorisation here, and therefore, that
(P1⊗P2)(gh) = 1/4.
Finally, we note that it follows from Property LP8 that, regardless of whether we adopt epistemic
subset- or atom-indepence, (P1⊗P2)(gh) ≤ (P1⊗P2)(gh). Therefore, and because we know from
Section 6 that epistemic event-independence leads to more informative joint models than epistemic
atom-independence, our results in this example imply that for epistemic atom-independence:
(P1⊗P2)(gh) ≥ 1/4 > 0= (P1⊗P2)(gh).
♦
As explained in Section 7, the failure of factorisation that we observe in this example is a first
important reason why we prefer epistemic event-independence over epistemic atom-independence.
The second reason is that epistemic atom-independence leads to an independent natural extension
that may be too uninformative, in the sense that P1⊗P2 can be excessively small. This too was
illustrated in the example above: for the same local models, epistemic event-independence gave rise
to substantially higher joint lower previsions.
That said, even for event-independence, (P1⊗P2)( f |B) and (P1⊗P2)( f |B) may still be different.
In that case, however, the reason is more subtle, and can be partially attributed to the fact that
for infinite spaces and finitely additive probability measures, Fubini’s theorem may not hold. We
demonstrate this in our final example, which relies heavily on the following proposition.
Proposition 37 Consider a linear prevision P1 on G (X1) and a linear prevision P2 on G (X2). Then
for all f ∈ G (X1×X2), we have that
(P1⊗P2)( f )≤ P1(P2( f ))≤ (P1⊗P2)( f ),
with P2( f ) a gamble on X1, defined by P2( f )(x1) := P2( f (x1,X2)) for all x1 ∈X1.
Example 9 Consider a linear prevision P1 on G (X1), a linear prevision P2 on G (X2) and any
f ∈ G (X1×X2) such that P1(P2( f )) 6= P2(P1( f )), where P2( f ) is defined as in Proposition 37
and where, similarly, P1( f ) is a gamble on X2 that is defined by P1( f )(x2) := P1( f (X1,x2)) for all
x2 ∈X2. It then follows from Proposition 37 and symmetry—reversing the role of P1 and P2—that
(P1⊗P2)( f )≤min{P1(P2( f )),P2(P1( f ))} <max{P1(P2( f )),P2(P1( f ))} ≤ (P1⊗P2)( f ).
Concrete examples where this situation occurs—that is, where P1(P2( f )) 6=P2(P1( f ))—can be found
in (Miranda and Zaffalon, 2015, Example 1) and (Schervish et al., 2017, Example 4). ♦
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10. Conclusions and Future Work
The main conclusion of this work is that by combining Williams-coherence with epistemic event-
independence, we obtain a notion of independent natural extension that always exists, and that fur-
thermore satisfies factorisation and external additivity. For weaker types of epistemic independence,
including epistemic atom-independence, the existence result and the external additivity property re-
main valid, but factorisation then requires measurability conditions and the resulting inferences
become less informative. For that reason, I think that when it comes to choosing between epistemic
event-independence and epistemic atom-independence, the former should be preferred over the lat-
ter. In fact, I would advocate that from now on, and contrary to the current convention, epistemic
independence should be taken to mean epistemic event-independence.
As far as future research is concerned, a first important step would be to extend our results
from the case of two variables to that of any finite number of variables. Based on our own pre-
liminary exploration of this topic, we expect that our proofs can be easily extended to that case.
However, care will have to be taken when considering concepts such as independence, factorisation
and external additivity, because for multiple variables, these have several variations; for finite state
spaces, (de Cooman et al., 2011) provides an excellent starting point.
Next, these extended versions of our results could then be used to develop efficient algorithms
for credal networks whose variables take values in infinite spaces, by suitably adapting existing algo-
rithms for the finite case. See for example the work by de Cooman et al. (2010), De Bock and de Cooman
(2014) and De Bock (2015).
On the more technical side, it would be useful to see whether our results can be extended from
gambles—which are taken to be bounded—to the more general case of unbounded functions; in that
case, establishing factorisation could prove to be tricky, because our proof for Corollary 26 relies
rather heavily on the fact that gambles are bounded.
Finally, for variables that take values in Euclidean space, I would suggest to take a closer look
at the case where B1 and B2 are restricted to the Lebesgue measurable events. Combined with a
suitably chosen assessment of continuity, I think that this might lead to the development of a notion
of independent natural extension that includes sigma additive product measures as a special case.
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Appendix A. Proofs and Additional Material
In order to avoid forward referencing—and the associated risk of circular reasoning—the order-
ing of the proofs in this appendix sometimes differs from the order in which the corresponding
results appear in the main text. Most importantly, the proofs and additional material for Section 8
are presented immediately after those of Section 3. Furthermore, since the proof of Proposition 3
relies on Proposition 4, the order of the proofs of these two results is reversed, and similarly for
Propositions 34 and 35.
A.1 Proofs and Additional Material for Section 2
Proof of Proposition 4 Since g≥ 0 is a gamble and therefore by definition bounded, there is some
α ∈Q>0 such that 0≤ g< α . Fix any n ∈ N and let gn ∈ G (X ) be defined by
gn :=
1
n
α
n−1
∑
k=1
IAk , where, for all k ∈ {1, . . . ,n−1}, Ak :=
{
x ∈X : g(x) ≥
k
n
α
}
.
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For all x ∈X , we then find that
gn(x) =
kx
n
α ≤ g(x) ≤
kx+1
n
α , where we let kx :=max{k ∈ {0, . . . ,n−1} : g(x) ≥
k
n
α},
which implies that |g(x)−gn(x)| ≤ α/n. Since this is true for every x ∈ X , this allows us to infer
that sup |g−gn| ≤ α/n.
Consider now any k ∈ {1, . . . ,n− 1}. Since k/nα ∈ Q≥0, it follows from our assumptions on g
that Ak is a finite union of pairwise disjoint events in B∪{X , /0}. Therefore, there is some mk ∈N
and, for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,mk}, some Bk,i ∈B∪{X , /0} such that IAk = ∑
mk
i=1 IBk,i . Since this is true for
every k ∈ {1, . . . ,n− 1}, it follows that gn = α/n∑
n−1
k=1 ∑
mk
i=1 IBk,i . Since gn is clearly non-negative,
and because IX = 1 and I /0 = 0, it now follows from Definition 1 that gn ∈ G≥0(X ) is a simple
B-measurable gamble.
So, in summary then, for any fixed n∈N, we know that we can construct a simple B-measurable
gamble gn ∈ G≥0(X ) such that sup |g−gn| ≤ α/n. Definition 2 therefore clearly implies that g is
B-measurable.
Proof of Proposition 3 Consider any B ⊆ P /0(X ) such that B
∗ := B∪{ /0} is a sigma field and
fix some g ∈ G≥0(X ).
We first prove the ‘only if’ part of the statement. So assume that g is B∗-measurable in the
measure-theoretic sense (Nielsen, 1997, Definition 10.1). It then follows from (Nielsen, 1997,
Corollary 10.5) that {x ∈ X : g(x) ≥ r} ∈ B∗ = B ∪{ /0} for all r ∈ Q≥0. Therefore, it follows
from Proposition 4 that g is B-measurable in the sense of Definition 2.
We end by proving the ‘if’ part of the statement. So assume that g is B-measurable in the sense
of Definition 2. This means that there is a sequence {gn}n∈N of simple B-measurable gambles in
G≥0(X ) such that limn→+∞ sup |g−gn|= 0. Then on the one hand, since limn→+∞ sup |g−gn|= 0
implies that limn→+∞ |g(x)−gn(x)| = 0 for all x ∈X , we know that {gn}n∈N converges pointwise
to g on X . On the other hand, for any n ∈ N, we know from Definition 1 that there are c0 ∈ R≥0,
m ∈N0 and, for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, ci ∈R≥0 and Bi ∈B, such that g= c0+∑
m
i=1 ciIBi . Let B0 = X .
Since IX = 1, and because B
∗ is a sigma field and therefore includes X , we then find that g =
∑mi=0 ciIBi , where, for all i ∈ {0, . . . ,n}, Bi ∈ B
∗. (Nielsen, 1997, Example 10.2) therefore implies
that gn is a B
∗-measurable function in the measure-theoretic sense. Since this is true for every
n ∈ N, and because {gn}n∈N converges pointwise to g on X , it now follows from (Nielsen, 1997,
Corollary 10.11(a)) that g is B∗-measurable in the measure-theoretic sense.
Proof of Corollary 5 Immediate consequence of Proposition 4.
A.2 Proofs and Additional Material for Section 3
Contrary to what the length of this section of the appendix might suggest, it should be noted that
many of the results and proofs in this section are essentially well-known. Historically, most of them
date back to Williams (1975, 2007). Our versions are basically just minor variations of his results,
expressed in terms of lower previsions—instead of upper previsions—and without imposing struc-
tural constraints on the domain. Similar results can also be found in (Pelessoni and Vicig, 2009)—
although often without or with only a minimal proof—and, for the case of Walley-coherence, in
(Miranda and Zaffalon, 2010).
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Lemma 38 For any A ⊆ G (X ), E (A ) is a coherent set of desirable gambles on X if and only if
it satisfies D4.
Proof of Lemma 38 Since Equation (2) implies that E (A ) satisfies D1, D2 and D3, this follows
trivially from Definition 6.
Lemma 39 Let A1 and A2 be two subsets of G (X ) such that A1 ⊆A2. Then
posi(A1)⊆ posi(A2) and E (A1)⊆ E (A2).
Proof of Lemma 39 This follows trivially from Equations (1) and (2).
Lemma 40 Let D be a coherent set of desirable gambles on X . Then E (D) = D .
Proof of Lemma 40 D is trivially a subset of E (D). The converse inclusion, that is, E (D) ⊆ D ,
is a straightforward consequence of the coherence of D .
Lemma 41 Let D be a coherent set of desirable gambles on X . If f ∈ G (X ) and f /∈ D ∪{0},
then E (D ∪{− f}) is a coherent set of desirable gambles on X .
Proof of Lemma 41 Consider any f ∈ G (X ) such that f /∈ D ∪{0}. Because of Lemma 38, it
suffices to prove that E (D ∪{− f}) satisfies D4. So consider any g ∈ G (X ) such that g≤ 0. In the
remainder of this proof, we show that g /∈ E (D ∪{− f}).
Assume ex absurdo that g ∈ E (D ∪{− f}). Since D is coherent, this implies that g= λh−µ f ,
with h ∈D , λ ,µ ∈ R≥0 and λ +µ > 0. If µ = 0, then because h ∈ D , the coherence of D implies
that g = λh ∈ D , which implies that D does not satisfy D4, a contradiction. Hence, it follows that
µ > 0, which implies that f = 1/µ(λh− g). Therefore, since h ∈ D and −g ≥ 0, it follows from
the coherence of D that f = 0 (if λ = 0 and g = 0) or f ∈ D . In both cases, we contradict our
assumptions.
Proof of Proposition 9 Consider any conditional lower prevision P on C ⊆ C (X ).
We start by proving the ‘only if’ part of the statement. So let us assume that P is coherent.
According to Definition 8, this implies that there is a coherent set of desirable gambles D on X
such that PD coincides with P on C . We need prove that P is real-valued and that it satisfies
Equation (4).
We begin by establishing that P is real-valued. So fix any ( f ,B) ∈ C . For all µ ∈ R such that
µ < inf f , it then follows from the coherence of D—and D1 in particular—that [ f − µ ]IB ∈ D .
Similarly, for all µ ∈R such that µ > sup f , it follows from D4 that [ f −µ ]IB /∈D . Hence, we find
that inf f ≤ PD ( f |B)≤ sup f . Since f is a gamble and therefore by definition bounded, this implies
that PD ( f |B) is real-valued, which in turn implies that P( f |B) is real-valued because PD coincides
with P on C . Since ( f ,B) ∈ C was arbitrary, this means that P is real-valued.
Next, we show that P satisfies Equation (4). Fix any n ∈ N0, choose any λ0, . . . ,λn ∈ R≥0 and
( f0,B0), . . . ,( fn,Bn) ∈ C , let B := ∪
n
i=0Bi and let h ∈ G (X ) be defined by
h(x) :=
n
∑
i=1
λiIBi(x)[ fi(x)−P( fi|Bi)]−λ0IB0(x)[ f0(x)−P( f0|B0)] for all x ∈X .
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We need to prove that supx∈B h(x)≥ 0. In order to do that, we start by fixing some ε > 0. Let ε0 := ε .
Since PD coincides with P on C , it then follows from Equation (3) that
g0 := [ f0−P( f0|B0)− ε0]IB0 = [ f0−PD ( f0|B0)− ε0]IB0 /∈D . (19)
Similarly, for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}, Equation (3) implies that there is some εi ≥ 0 such that εi ≤ ε and
gi := [ fi−P( fi|Bi)+ εi]IBi = [ fi−PD( fi|Bi)+ εi]IBi ∈D . (20)
Now let g := λ0g0−∑
n
i=1 λigi and assume ex absurdo that g ∈D . Since D is coherent and therefore
satisfies D2 and D3, it then follows from Equation (20) that
λ0g0 = g+
n
∑
i=1
λigi = g+
n
∑
i=1
λi 6=0
λigi ∈D .
If λ0 = 0, this implies that 0 ∈D , which contradicts D4. If λ0 > 0, this implies that g0 ∈D because
of D2, which contradicts Equation (19). Since both cases lead to a contradiction, we conclude that
g /∈D . Since the coherence of D implies that G>0(X )⊆D , this allows us to infer that g /∈ G>0(X ).
Since g(x) = 0 for all x ∈X \B, this implies that infx∈B g(x) ≤ 0. Hence, we find that
0≤− inf
x∈B
g(x) = sup
x∈B
−g(x) = sup
x∈B
(
h(x)+
n
∑
i=0
λiεiIBi(x)
)
≤ sup
x∈B
h(x)+ sup
x∈B
( n
∑
i=0
λiεiIBi(x)
)
≤ sup
x∈B
h(x)+
n
∑
i=0
λiεi,
which implies that
sup
x∈B
h(x)≥−
n
∑
i=0
λiεi ≥−ε
n
∑
i=0
λi.
Since this is true for every ε > 0, it follows that supx∈B h(x) ≥ 0, as desired.
It remains to prove the ‘if’ part of the statement. So let us assume that P is real-valued and that
it satisfies Equation (4). We need to prove that P is coherent.
Let AP and E (P) be defined by Equation (5). We start by proving that E (P) is a coherent set of
desirable gambles on X . Fix any f ∈ E (P). We then know from Equations (1), (2) and (5) that
f =
n
∑
i=1
λiIBi [ fi−µi]+
m
∑
j=n+1
λ j f j ≥
n
∑
i=1
λiIBi [ fi−µi] (21)
for some n ∈ N0 and m ∈ N such that n ≤ m, with λ1, . . . ,λm ∈ R>0, fn+1, . . . , fm ∈ G>0(X ),
( f1,B1), . . . ,( fn,Bn) ∈ C and µ1, . . . ,µn ∈ R such that µi < P( fi|Bi) for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}. We con-
sider two cases: f ∈ G>0(X ) and f /∈ G>0(X ). If f ∈ G>0(X ), then f 6≤ 0. If f /∈ G>0(X ), then
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n 6= 0. Therefore, if we let A := ∪ni=1Bi 6= /0, it follows from Equations (21) and (4) that
sup
x∈A
f (x) ≥ sup
x∈A
( n
∑
i=1
λiIBi(x)[ fi(x)−µi]
)
= sup
x∈A
( n
∑
i=1
λiIBi(x)[ fi(x)−P( fi|Bi)]+
n
∑
i=1
λiIBi(x)[P( fi|Bi)−µi]
)
≥ sup
x∈A
( n
∑
i=1
λiIBi(x)[ fi(x)−P( fi|Bi)]
)
+ inf
x∈A
( n
∑
i=1
λiIBi(x)[P( fi|Bi)−µi]
)
≥ inf
x∈A
( n
∑
i=1
λiIBi(x)[P( fi|Bi)−µi]
)
≥ min
1≤i≤n
λi[P( fi|Bi)−µi]> 0,
which implies that f 6≤ 0. Hence, in both cases, we find that f 6≤ 0. Since f ∈ E (P) is arbitrary, this
implies that E (P) satisfies D4. Since E (P) := E (AP), it now follows from Lemma 38 that E (P) is
a coherent set of desirable gambles on X .
In the remainder of this proof, we will show that PE (P) coincides with P on C . Since E (P) is
a coherent set of desirable gambles on X , Definition 8 then implies that P is coherent, as desired.
So fix any ( f ,B) ∈ C . We need to prove that P( f |B) = PE (P)( f |B). However, since Equation (5)
implies that [ f −µ ]IB ∈ E (P) for all µ <P( f |B), it follows trivially from Equation (3) that P( f |B)≤
PE (P)( f |B). Therefore, it remains to prove that P( f |B)≥ PE (P)( f |B).
Consider any µ ∈ R such that [ f −µ ]IB ∈ E (P). We then know from Equations (1), (2) and (5)
that
[ f −µ ]IB =
n
∑
i=1
λiIBi [ fi−µi]+
m
∑
j=n+1
λ j f j ≥
n
∑
i=1
λiIBi [ fi−µi] (22)
for some n ∈ N0 and m ∈ N such that n ≤ m, with λ1, . . . ,λm ∈ R>0, fn+1, . . . , fm ∈ G>0(X ), and
( f1,B1), . . . ,( fn,Bn)∈ C and µ1, . . . ,µn ∈R such that µi < P( fi|Bi) for all i∈ {1, . . . ,n}. Therefore,
if we let A := B∪
(
∪ni=1 Bi
)
6= /0, we find that
sup
x∈A
( n
∑
i=1
λiIBi(x)[µi−P( fi|Bi)]− IB(x)[µ −P( f |B)]
)
≥ sup
x∈A
( n
∑
i=1
λiIBi(x)[µi−P( fi|Bi)]− IB(x)[µ −P( f |B)]+
n
∑
i=1
λiIBi(x)[ fi(x)−µi]− IB(x)[ f (x)−µ ]
)
= sup
x∈A
( n
∑
i=1
λiIBi(x)[ fi(x)−P( fi|Bi)]− IB(x)[ f (x)−P( f |B)]
)
≥ 0 (23)
where the first inequality follows from Equation (22) and the last inequality follows from Equa-
tion (4). Since λi > 0 and µi−P( fi|Bi)< 0, this implies that µ ≤ P( f |B). Since this true for every
µ ∈ R such that [ f −µ ]IB ∈ E (P), it follows from Equation (3) that PE (P)( f |B)≤ P( f |B).
Proof of Proposition 10 Consider any coherent set of desirable gambles D on X such that PD
coincides with P on C . Since P is coherent, we know from Definition 8 that there is at least one
such set D . We start by proving that E (P)⊆D .
Fix any ( f ,B) ∈ C and any µ < P( f |B). Since PD ( f |B) = P( f |B), we know that µ < PD ( f |B),
and therefore, it follows from Equation (3) that there is some µ∗ ∈ R such that [ f −µ∗]IB ∈D and
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µ < µ∗≤PD ( f |B). Furthermore, since µ
∗> µ and B 6= /0, we also know that [µ∗−µ ]IB ∈G>0(X ),
which implies that [µ∗− µ ]IB ∈ D because of D1. Since [ f − µ
∗]IB ∈ D and [µ
∗− µ ]IB ∈ D , it
now follows from D3 that [ f − µ ]IB = [ f − µ
∗]IB + [µ
∗− µ ]IB ∈ D . Since this is true for every
( f ,B) ∈ C and µ < P( f |B), we infer that AP ⊆ D , and therefore, because of Lemmas 39 and 40,
that E (P) = E (AP)⊆ E (D) = D .
Next, since D is coherent and E (P) ⊆ D , it follows from Definition 6 that E (P) satisfies D4.
Therefore, and because E (P) = E (AP), it follows from Lemma 38 that E (P) is a coherent set of
desirable gambles on X . Hence, it remains to prove that PE (P) coincides with P on C .
Fix any ( f ,B) ∈ C . Then on the one hand, since E (P)⊆D , we have that
PE (P)( f |B)≤ PD ( f |B) = P( f |B).
On the other hand, since we know from Equation (5) that [ f − µ ]IB ∈ E (P) for all µ < P( f |B), it
follows from Equation (3) that PE (P)( f |B) ≥ P( f |B). Hence, we find that PE (P)( f |B) = P( f |B).
Since ( f ,B) ∈ C is arbitrary, this implies that PE (P) coincides with P on C .
Proposition 42 Let P be a coherent conditional lower prevision on C ⊆ C (X ). Then for any C ′⊆
C (X ) such that C ⊆ C ′, the restriction of E to C ′ is the pointwise smallest coherent conditional
lower prevision on C ′ that coincides with P on C .
Proof of Proposition 42 Let P be a coherent conditional lower prevision on C ⊆ C (X ) and con-
sider any C ′ ⊆ C (X ) such that C ⊆ C ′. Then as we know from Proposition 10, E is a coherent
conditional lower prevision on C (X ) that coincides with P on C . Since it follows trivially from
Definition 8 that restricting the domain of a coherent conditional lower prevision preserves its co-
herence, this implies that the restriction of E to C ′ is a coherent conditional lower prevision on C ′
that coincides with P on C . It remains to show that it is dominated by any other coherent conditional
lower prevision on C ′ that coincides with P on C .
So consider any coherent conditional lower prevision P′ on C ′ that coincides with P on C .
Because of Definition 8, this implies that there is a coherent set of desirable gambles D on X such
that PD coincides with P
′ on C ′. Since this clearly implies that PD coincides with P on C , it now
follows from Proposition 10 that E (P)⊆D , which implies that E = PE (P) ≤ PD . Hence, since PD
coincides with P′ on C ′, we find that E is dominated by P′ on C ′, as desired.
Proof of Proposition 11 Immediate consequence of Proposition 42.
Lemma 43 Let P be a coherent conditional lower prevision on C ⊆ C (X ). Then for any ( f ,B) ∈
C such that f IB ∈ E (P), we have that P( f |B)≥ 0.
Proof of Lemma 43 It suffices to notice that
P( f |B) = E( f |B) = PE (P)( f |B) = sup{µ ∈ R : [ f −µ ]IB ∈ E (P)} ≥ 0,
where the equalities follow from Proposition 11, Equation (6) and Equation (3), respectively, and
where the final inequality follows from the fact that f IB ∈ E (P).
Lemma 44 Let P be a coherent lower prevision on G ⊆ G (X ). Then for any f ∈ G ∩ E (P), we
have that P( f )≥ 0.
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Proof of Lemma 44 Immediate consequence of Lemma 43, for C = {( f ,X ) : f ∈ G }.
Proof of Proposition 12 Let P be a coherent conditional lower prevision on C ⊆ C (X ). Def-
inition 8 and Equation (3) then immediately imply that P satisfies LP7. Now let E be its natural
extension to C (X ). We will prove that E satisfies LP1–LP6 and LP8. Since we know from Propo-
sition 42 that E coincides with P on C , this then implies that P satisfies LP1–LP6 and LP8 on its
domain—that is, whenever the expressions are well-defined.
Since we know from Proposition 42 that E is coherent, it follows from Proposition 9 that E
is real-valued and satisfies Equation (4), which means that it satisfies the notion of Williams co-
herence that is considered in Pelessoni and Vicig (2009) and Williams (2007). It therefore fol-
lows from (Pelessoni and Vicig, 2009, Theorem 2) or (Williams, 2007, (A1*)–(A4*)) that E sat-
isfies LP1–LP4. Consider now any B ∈ P /0(X ). Since the operator E(·|B) : G (X ) → R satis-
fies LP1–LP3, it is a coherent lower prevision on G (X ) in the sense of (Walley, 1991, Section 2.5.5).
Therefore, it follows from (Walley, 1991, Section 2.6.1) that E(·|B) satisfies LP5, LP6 and LP8.
Since this is true for every B ∈P /0(X ), it follows that E satisfies LP5, LP6 and LP8 as well.
Proof of Proposition 13 If P is coherent, we know from Proposition 9 that P is real-valued and from
Proposition 12 that it satisfies LP1–LP4. So assume that P is real-valued and satisfies LP1–LP4.
We need to prove that P is coherent.
Because of Proposition 9, it suffices to show for all n ∈ N0 and all choices of λ0, . . . ,λn ∈ R≥0
and ( f0,B0), . . . ,( fn,Bn) ∈ C that
sup
x∈B
( n
∑
i=1
λiIBi(x)[ fi(x)−P( fi|Bi)]−λ0IB0(x)[ f0(x)−P( f0|B0)]
)
≥ 0,
with B := ∪ni=0Bi. So let us consider any n ∈N0, λ0, . . . ,λn ∈R≥0 and ( f0,B0), . . . ,( fn,Bn) ∈ C and
let B :=∪ni=0Bi. Since B is a finite union of events in B and because B is closed under finite unions,
we know that B ∈ B. Therefore, and because F is a linear space such that IB f ∈ F and IB ∈ F
for all f ∈F and B ∈B, it now follows from (LP3) that
P(λ0IB0 [ f0−P( f0|B0)]|B)
≥ P
(
λ0IB0 [ f0−P( f0|B0)]−
n
∑
i=1
λiIBi [ fi−P( fi|Bi)]
∣∣∣B)+ n∑
i=1
P
(
λiIBi [ fi−P( fi|Bi)]
∣∣B).
Hence, since we know from LP2 and LP4—and our assumptions on F and B—that
P
(
λiIBi [ fi−P( fi|Bi)]
∣∣B)= λiP(IBi [ fi−P( fi|Bi)]∣∣B)= 0 for all i ∈ {0, . . . ,n},
it follows from LP1 that
0≥ P
(
λ0IB0 [ f0−P( f0|B0)]−
n
∑
i=1
λiIBi [ fi−P( fi|Bi)]
∣∣∣B)
≥ inf
x∈B
(
λ0IB0(x)[ f0(x)−P( f0|B0)]−
n
∑
i=1
λiIBi(x)[ fi(x)−P( fi|Bi)]
)
=−sup
x∈B
( n
∑
i=1
λiIBi(x)[ fi(x)−P( fi|Bi)]−λ0IB0(x)[ f0(x)−P( f0|B0)]
)
,
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as desired.
Proof of Corollary 14 Immediate consequence of Proposition 13.
Proof of Corollary 15 Let F := G and B := {X }. Since IX = 1, the conditions of Proposition 13
are then clearly satisfied. Hence, since a lower prevision on G is by definition a conditional lower
prevision on C := {( f ,X ) : f ∈ G }, it follows from Proposition 13 that P is coherent if and only if
it is real-valued and satisfies LP1–LP4. Therefore, the only thing that we still need to prove is that
any real-valued lower prevision P on G that satisfies LP1–LP3 will also satisfy LP4.
So consider any real-valued lower prevision P on G that satisfies LP1–LP3. By definition, this
operator is then a coherent lower prevision in the sense of (Walley, 1991, Section 2.5.5), and it
therefore follows from (Walley, 1991, Section 2.6.1) that P( f −P( f )) = P( f )−P( f ) = 0 for all
f ∈ G . Since the domain of a(n unconditional) lower prevision contains only couples of the form
( f ,X ), this implies that P satisfies LP4.
A.3 Proofs and dditional Material for Section 8
Here too, as in Appendix A.2, it should be noted that the results and proofs in this section are
essentially well-known; they are basically just minor variations of the results of Williams (1975,
2007) and Pelessoni and Vicig (2009).
Proof of Proposition 30 Because of definitions 28 and 29, we know that P is a coherent condi-
tional lower prevision on C that satisfies Equation (14). Due to Proposition 12, this implies that P
satisfies LP1–LP7. P1 and P5–P7 follow trivially from LP1 and LP5–LP7, respectively. P2 holds
because
P(λ f |B) =
{
λP( f |B) if λ ≥ 0
−λP(− f |B) if λ ≤ 0
= λP( f |B)
where the first equality follows from LP2 and the second one follows from Equation (14). P3 holds
because
P( f |B)+P(g|B)≤ P( f +g|B) =−P(− f −g|B)≤−P(− f |B)−P(−g|B) = P( f |B)+P(g|B),
where the inequalities follow from LP3 and the equalities follow from Equation (14). Finally, P4
holds because
P(IB f |A)−P( f |A∩B)P(B|A) = P(IB f |A)−P( f |A∩B)P(IB|A) = P(IB[ f −P( f |A∩B)]|A) = 0
where second equality follows from P2 and P3 and the third equality follows from LP4.
Proof of Proposition 31 If P is a conditional linear prevision on C , we know from Proposition 13
that P is real-valued and from Proposition 30 that it satisfies P1–P4. So assume that P is real-valued
and satisfies P1–P4. We need to prove that P is a conditional linear prevision on C .
Since P satisfies P1–P3, it clearly satisfies LP1–LP3 as well. P also satisfies LP4 because, for
all f ∈F and A,B ∈P /0(X ) such that A ∈B and /0 6= A∩B ∈B, it follows from P2–P4 that
P(IB[ f −P( f |A∩B)]|A) = P(IB f |A)−P( f |A∩B)P(IB|A) = P(IB f |A)−P( f |A∩B)P(B|A) = 0.
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Since P is real-valued and satisfies LP1–LP4, and because we know from Definition 28 that P is
a conditional lower prevision on C , Proposition 13 now implies that P is coherent. Therefore, it
follows from Definition 29 that P is a conditional linear prevision on C .
Proof of Corollary 32 Immediate consequence of Proposition 31.
Proof of Corollary 33 Let F := G and B := {X }. Since IX = 1, the conditions of Proposition 31
are then clearly satisfied. Hence, since a prevision on G is by definition a conditional prevision
on C := {( f ,X ) : f ∈ G }, it follows from Proposition 31 that P is coherent if and only if it is
real-valued and satisfies P1–P4. Therefore, the only thing that we still need to prove is that any
real-valued prevision P on G that satisfies P1–P3 will also satisfy P4.
So consider any real-valued prevision P on G that satisfies P1–P3. Since the domain of a(n
unconditional) prevision contains only couples of the form ( f ,X ), proving P4 reduces to showing
that P( f |X ) = P( f |X )P(X |X ) for all f ∈ G . Hence, it suffices to prove that P(X |X ) = 1.
On the one hand, we know from P1 that P(1)≥ 1. On the other hand, it follows from P2 and P1
that P(1) = −P(−1) ≤ −(−1) = 1. Hence, we find that P(1) = 1. Since P(X |X ) = P(X ) =
P(IX ) = P(1), this establishes the desired result.
Lemma 45 A conditional prevision on C (X ) is linear if and only if it is real-valued and satis-
fies P1’ and P2–P4, with
P1’: P( f |B)≤ supx∈B f (x) for all ( f ,B) ∈ C (X ).
Proof of Lemma 45 Since P is a conditional prevision and therefore satisfies Equation (14), we see
that P satisfies P1 if and only if it satisfies P1’. Therefore, the result follows from Corollary 32.
Proposition 46 Let P be a coherent conditional lower prevision on C (X ) and let P be the corre-
sponding conditional upper prevision on C (X ). Then there is a non-empty set P∗ of conditional
linear previsions on C (X ) such that
P( f |B) =min{P( f |B) : P ∈ P∗} and P( f |B) =max{P( f |B) : P ∈ P∗}
for all ( f ,B) ∈ C (X ). Furthermore, for any ( f ,B) ∈ C (X ) and α ∈ [P( f |B),P( f |B)], there is
some P ∈ P∗ such that P( f |B) = α .
Proof of Proposition 46 Since P is coherent, it follows from Proposition 9 that P is real-valued
and satisfies Equation (4). Therefore, for all n ∈ N0 and all choices of λ0, . . . ,λn ∈ R≥0 and
( f0,B0), . . . ,( fn,Bn) ∈ C (X ), if we let B := ∪
n
i=0Bi, we find that
sup
x∈B
( n
∑
i=1
λiIBi(x)[(− fi(x))−P(− fi|Bi)]−λ0IB0(x)[(− f0(x))−P(− f0|B0)]
)
= sup
x∈B
(
λ0IB0(x)[ f0(x)−P( f0|B0)]−
n
∑
i=1
λiIBi(x)[ fi(x)−P( fi|Bi)]
)
≥ 0.
Since this means that P satisfies condition (A*) in Williams (2007), it now follows from (Williams,
2007, Theorem 2, Definition 2 and Proposition 6) and Lemma 45 that there is a non-empty set P∗
of conditional linear previsions on C (X ) such that
P( f |B) = sup{P( f |B) : P ∈ P∗}=max{P( f |B) : P ∈ P∗} for all ( f ,B) ∈ C (X ) (24)
32
INDEPENDENT NATURAL EXTENSION FOR INFINITE SPACES
and such that, for all ( f ,B) ∈ C (X ) and α ∈ [P( f |B),P( f |B)], there is some P ∈ P∗ such that
P( f |B) = α . The first equality in Equation (24) corresponds to (Williams, 2007, Theorem 2); the
second equality in Equation (24) and the statement about α is not stated in (Williams, 2007, The-
orem 2) itself, but clearly follows from the end of its proof. (Williams, 2007, Definition 2 and
Proposition 6) and Lemma 45 are needed solely for the purpose of establishing that what Williams
calls a conditional prevision in (Williams, 2007, Theorem 2) is equivalent to what we here call a
conditional linear prevision on C (X ). Finally, we have that
P( f |B) =−P(− f |B) =−max{P(− f |B) : P ∈ P∗}
=−max{−P( f |B) : P ∈ P∗}=min{P( f |B) : P ∈ P∗},
where the second equality follows from Equation (24) and the third equality follows from Equa-
tion (14).
Proposition 47 Let P∗ be a non-empty set of conditional linear previsions on C (X ), consider
some domain C ⊆ C (X ), and let P be the conditional lower prevision on C that is defined by
P( f |B) = inf{P( f |B) : P ∈ P∗} for all ( f ,B) ∈ C . (25)
Then P is coherent.
Proof of Proposition 47 We will prove that P is real-valued and that, for all n ∈N0 and all choices
of λ0, . . . ,λn ∈R≥0 and ( f0,B0), . . . ,( fn,Bn) ∈ C ,
sup
x∈B
( n
∑
i=1
λiIBi(x)[ fi(x)−P( fi|Bi)]−λ0IB0(x)[ f0(x)−P( f0|B0)]
)
≥ 0, (26)
with B := ∪ni=0Bi. Proposition 9 then implies that P is coherent.
Let us first prove that P is real-valued. Fix any ( f ,B) ∈ C . For every P ∈ P∗, it then follows
from Proposition 30 and Lemma 45 that infx∈B ≤ P( f |B) ≤ supx∈B f (x). Hence, since P
∗ is non-
empty, it follows from Equation (25) that infx∈B ≤ P( f |B) ≤ supx∈B f (x). Since f is a gamble and
therefore by definition bounded, this implies that P( f |B) is real-valued. Since this is true for every
( f ,B) ∈ C , it follows that P is real-valued.
Finally, fix any n ∈ N0, any λ0, . . . ,λn ∈ R≥0 and ( f0,B0), . . . ,( fn,Bn) ∈ C , let B := ∪
n
i=0Bi and
consider any ε > 0. It then follows from Equation (25) that there is a conditional linear prevision
P ∈ P∗ on C (X ) such that λ0P( f0|B0) ≤ λ0P( f0|B0) + ε . Furthermore, for any i ∈ {1, . . . ,n},
Equation (25) also implies that P( fi|Bi)≥ P( fi|Bi). Hence, we find that
sup
x∈B
( n
∑
i=1
λiIBi(x)[ fi(x)−P( fi|Bi)]−λ0IB0(x)[ f0(x)−P( f0|B0)]
)
≥ sup
x∈B
( n
∑
i=1
λiIBi(x)[ fi(x)−P( fi|Bi)]−λ0IB0(x)[ f0(x)−P( f0|B0)]− IB0ε
)
≥ sup
x∈B
( n
∑
i=1
λiIBi(x)[ fi(x)−P( fi|Bi)]−λ0IB0(x)[ f0(x)−P( f0|B0)]
)
− ε ≥−ε ,
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where the last inequality follows from Proposition 9 because we know from Definition 29 that P is
coherent. Since ε > 0 is arbitrary, we obtain Equation (26), as desired.
Proof of Proposition 35 Since we know from Proposition 11 that E is coherent, Proposition 46
implies that there is a non-empty set P∗ of conditional linear previsions on C (X ) such that
E( f |B) =min{P( f |B) : P ∈ P∗} and E( f |B) =max{P( f |B) : P ∈ P∗} (27)
for all ( f ,B)∈C (X ) and such that, furthermore, for any ( f ,B)∈C (X ) and α ∈ [P( f |B),P( f |B)],
there is some P ∈ P∗ such that P( f |B) = α .
Consider now any P ∈ P∗. For any ( f ,B) ∈C , Proposition 11 and Equation (27) then imply that
P( f |B) = E( f |B) =−E(− f |B) =−max{P˜( f |B) : P˜ ∈ P∗} ≤ P( f |B).
Therefore, it follows that P ∈ PP and, since this is true for every P ∈ P
∗, that P∗ ⊆ PP. Hence, it
follows that for all ( f ,B) ∈ C (X ) and α ∈ [E( f |B),E( f |B)], there is some P ∈ P∗ ⊆ PP such that
P( f |B) = α , which already establishes the final part of our proposition.
The first part of the proposition follows from this last part. Fix any ( f ,B) ∈ C (X ). Since E
is coherent, we know from Proposition 12 that E( f |B) ≤ E( f |B), which implies that the interval
[E( f |B),E( f |B)] is non-empty. The final part of our proposition therefore implies that PP 6= /0,
simply by choosing some α ∈ [E( f |B),E( f |B)] and considering the corresponding P ∈ PP.
The only thing left to prove now is Equation (17). However, since E( f |B) = −E(− f |B), the
second part of that equation follows trivially from the first part. Hence, it suffices to prove that
E( f |B) =min{P( f |B : P ∈ PP} for all ( f ,B) ∈ C (X ).
To this end, let P˜ be the conditional lower prevision on C (X ) that is defined by
P˜( f |B) := inf{P( f |B : P ∈ PP} for all ( f ,B) ∈ C (X ). (28)
Then on the one hand, since P∗ ⊆ PP, it follows from Equation (27) that for all ( f ,B) ∈ C (X ):
E( f |B) =min{P( f |B) : P ∈ P∗} ≥ inf{P( f |B) : P ∈ PP}= P˜( f |B). (29)
On the other hand, for any ( f ,B) ∈ C , Proposition 11 and Equation (16) imply that
E( f |B) = P( f |B)≤ inf{P( f |B) : P ∈ PP}= P˜( f |B).
By combining these two results, it follows that P˜ coincides with P on C . Furthermore, since PP is
a non-empty set of conditional linear previsions on C (X ), we know from Proposition 47 that P˜ is
coherent. Therefore, it follows from Proposition 11 that P˜( f |B) ≥ E( f |B) for all ( f ,B) ∈ C (X ).
Combined, with Equation (28) and (29), this implies that
E( f |B) = P˜( f |B) = inf{P( f |B) : P ∈ PP} for all ( f ,B) ∈ C (X ). (30)
It remains to show that this infimum is actually a minimum. This can easily be inferred from
Equation (27), as follows. For any ( f ,B) ∈ C (X ), Equation (27) implies that there is some P ∈ P∗
such that P( f |B) =E( f |B) and, since P∗⊆ PP, this in turn implies that the infimum in Equation (30)
is a minimum.
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Proof of Proposition 34 We first prove the ‘only if’ part of the statement. So consider any coherent
conditional lower prevision on C ⊆ C (X ). For any ( f ,B) ∈ C , we then have that
P( f |B) = E( f |B) =min{P( f |B) : P ∈ PP},
where E is the natural extension of P to C (X ), and where the first equality follows from Proposi-
tion 11 and the second from Proposition 35. Since every minimum is an infimum, the ‘only if’ part
of the statement follows by choosing P∗ = PP.
The ‘if’ part of the statement is an immediate consequence of Proposition 47.
A.4 Proofs and Additional Material for Section 5
A.4.1 THE SETS OF DESIRABLE GAMBLES PART
Proposition 48 D1⊗D2 is a coherent set of desirable gambles on X1×X2.
Proof of Proposition 48 Because of Lemma 38, it suffices to prove D4. So consider any f ∈
D1⊗D2 and assume ex absurdo that f ≤ 0. We will prove that this leads to a contradiction.
Since D1 and D2 are coherent, they are closed with respect to positive scaling and finite sums.
Therefore, and because f ∈ D1⊗D2 = E (A1→2∪A2→1), it follows from Equations (9) and (10)
that
f = ∑
i∈I
IB1,i(X1) f2,i(X2)+∑
j∈J
IB2, j(X2) f1, j(X1)+g, (31)
with I and J finite—possibly empty—index sets, with B1,i ∈ P /0(X1) and f2,i ∈ D2 for all i ∈ I,
with B2, j ∈ P /0(X2) and f1, j ∈ D1 for all j ∈ J, with g ≥ 0, and where g = 0 is only possible if
|I|+ |J|> 0.
Let us assume ex absurdo that |I|+ |J|= 0. Then on the one hand, since we know that g= 0 is
only possible if |I|+ |J|> 0, it follows that g 6= 0. On the other hand, |I|+ |J|= 0 also implies that
I = J = /0, and therefore, due to Equation (31), that f = g. Since g≥ 0 and f ≤ 0, this in turn implies
that g= 0, thereby contradicting the fact that g 6= 0. Hence, it follows that at least one of the two ex
absurdo assumptions that we have so far made must be wrong. If f 6≤ 0, then the proof is finished.
For that reason, in the remainder of the proof, we can assume that |I|+ |J| 6= 0, and therefore, that
|I|+ |J|> 0. The only ex absurdo assumption that still remains is that f ≤ 0.
Now let {B1,k}k∈K be the set consisting of those atoms of the algebra generated by {B1,i}i∈I that
belong to ∪i∈IB1,i and, for all k ∈ K, let f2,k := ∑i∈I : B1,k⊆B1,i f2,i. The following properties are then
easily verified. First, since I is finite, K is also finite. Secondly, |K|= 0 if and only if |I|= 0. Thirdly,
for all k ∈ K, we have that B1,k ∈ P /0(X1) and—since D1 is coherent and therefore satisfies D3—
that f2,k ∈ D1. Fourthly, ∑k∈K IB1,k(X1) f2,k(X2) is equal to ∑i∈I IB1,i(X1) f2,i(X2). Fifthly, the events
in {B1,k}k∈K are pairwise disjoint. For this reason, without loss of generality, we can assume the
events {B1,i}i∈I in Equation (31) to be pairwise disjoint. A completely similar argument leads us to
conclude that the events {B2, j} j∈J in Equation (31) can be assumed to be pairwise disjoint, again
without loss of generality.
If {B1,i}i∈I is a partition of X1, then we let Y1 := I. Otherwise, we let Y1 := I ∪ {i
∗} and
define B1,i∗ := X1 \ ∪i∈IB1,i. Similarly, we let Y2 := J if {B2, j} j∈J is a partition of X2, and let
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Y2 := J∪{ j
∗} and B1, j∗ := X2 \∪ j∈JB2, j otherwise. Next, for every i ∈ I, we let h2,i be a gamble
on Y2, defined by
h2,i(y2) := sup{ f2,i(x2) : x2 ∈ B2,y2} for all y2 ∈ Y2. (32)
Similarly, for every j ∈ J, we let h1, j be a gamble on Y1, defined by
h1, j(y1) := sup{ f1, j(x1) : x1 ∈ B1,y1} for all y1 ∈ Y1. (33)
Using these gambles on Y1 and Y2, we now construct a real-valued function h on Y1×Y2, defined
by
h(y1,y2) := ∑
i∈I
Ii(y1)h2,i(y2)+∑
j∈J
I j(y2)h1, j(y1) for all y1 ∈ Y1 and y2 ∈ Y2 (34)
This function is non-positive, in the sense that h ≤ 0. In order to prove that, let us fix any y1 ∈ Y1
and y2 ∈ Y2. It then follows from Equations (32) and (33) that
h(y1,y2) = ∑
i∈I
Ii(y1) sup
x2∈B2,y2
f2,i(x2)+∑
j∈J
I j(y2) sup
x1∈B1,y1
f1, j(x1).
Since Ii(y1) can be non-zero for at most one i ∈ I and I j(y2) can be non-zero for at most one j ∈ J,
we know that each of the two summations on the right hand side contains at most one non-zero
term. The suprema can therefore be moved outside of the summations, yielding
h(y1,y2) = sup
x1∈B1,y1
sup
x2∈B2,y2
(
∑
i∈I
Ii(y1) f2,i(x2)+∑
j∈J
I j(y2) f1, j(x1)
)
.
For the next step, we start by observing the following. For any x1 ∈ B1,y1 and any i ∈ I, since the
sets {B1,i}i∈I are pairwise disjoint, we know that x1 ∈ B1,i if and only if y1 = i, which implies that
Ii(y1) = IB1,i(x1). Similarly, for any x2 ∈ B2,y2 and any j ∈ J, since the sets {B2, j} j∈J are pairwise
disjoint, we know that x2 ∈ B2, j if and only if y2 = j, which implies that I j(y2) = IB2, j(x2). As an
immediate consequence, it follows that
h(y1,y2) = sup
x1∈B1,y1
sup
x2∈B2,y2
(
∑
i∈I
IB1,i(x1) f2,i(x2)+∑
j∈J
IB2, j(x2) f1, j(x1)
)
.
Finally, in combination with Equation (31), this implies that
h(y1,y2) = sup
x1∈B1,y1
sup
x2∈B2,y2
( f (x1,x2)−g(x1,x2))≤ 0,
where, for the last inequality, we use the fact that f ≤ 0 and g≥ 0. Since this true for every y1 ∈ Y1
and y2 ∈ Y2, it follows that h≤ 0.
Now let A1 := {h1, j : j ∈ J} and A2 := {h2,i : i ∈ I} and assume ex absurdo that H1 := E (A1)
and H2 := E (A2) are coherent sets of desirable gambles on Y1 and Y2, respectively. We will prove
that this is impossible, by constructing a probability mass function p on X1×X2 such that the cor-
responding expectation of h is both non-positive and positive, thereby obtaining a contradiction. In
order to do that, we borrow an argument of De Cooman andMiranda (2012, Proof of Proposition 15)
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that is based on a very useful lemma of them, which, in order to make this paper self-contained, is
restated here in Lemma 49.
Since H1 is a coherent set of desirable gambles on Y1, it follows from Definition 6—and D4 in
particular—that 0 /∈H1= E (A1). Therefore, and because Y1 and J—and hence alsoA1—are finite,
it follows from Lemma 49 that there is a probability mass function p1 on Y1 such that p1(y1) > 0
for all y1 ∈ Y1 and ∑y1∈Y1 p1(y1)h1, j(y1)> 0 for all j ∈ J. Using a completely analogous argument,
we also infer that there is a probability mass function p2 on Y2 such that p2(y2)> 0 for all y2 ∈ Y2
and ∑y2∈Y2 p2(y2)h2,i(y2)> 0 for all i ∈ I.
We now let p be the probability mass function on Y1 ×Y2 that is defined by p(y1,y2) :=
p1(y1)p2(y2) for all y1 ∈ Y1 and y2 ∈ Y2, and we let Ep(h) be the expectation of h with respect
to p, as defined by
Ep(h) := ∑
y1∈Y1
∑
y2∈Y2
p(y1,y2)h(y1,y2) = ∑
y1∈Y1
∑
y2∈Y2
p1(y1)p2(y2)h(y1,y2).
Then on the one hand, since h≤ 0, we have that Ep(h) ≤ 0. On the other hand, however, it follows
from Equation (34) that
Ep(h) = ∑
y1∈Y1
∑
y2∈Y2
p1(y1)p2(y2)
(
∑
i∈I
Ii(y1)h2,i(y2)+∑
j∈J
I j(y2)h1, j(y1)
)
= ∑
y1∈Y1
∑
y2∈Y2
p1(y1)p2(y2)∑
i∈I
Ii(y1)h2,i(y2)+ ∑
y1∈Y1
∑
y2∈Y2
p1(y1)p2(y2)∑
j∈J
I j(y2)h1, j(y1)
= ∑
i∈I
∑
y1∈Y1
p1(y1)Ii(y1) ∑
y2∈Y2
p2(y2)h2,i(y2)+∑
j∈J
∑
y2∈Y2
p2(y2)I j(y2) ∑
y1∈Y1
p1(y1)h1, j(y1)
= ∑
i∈I
p1(i) ∑
y2∈Y2
p2(y2)h2,i(y2)+∑
j∈J
p2( j) ∑
y1∈Y1
p1(y1)h1, j(y1).
For every i ∈ I, it follows from the properties of p1 and p2 that the corresponding term in this
summation is positive. Similarly, for every j ∈ J, it follows from the properties of p1 and p2 that the
corresponding term in this summation is positive. Since |I|+ |J| > 0, this implies that Ep(h) > 0,
thereby contradicting the fact that Ep(h) ≤ 0. Hence, it follows that one of the two remaining ex
absurdo assumptions is wrong. If f ≤ 0, then the proof is finished. Therefore, in the remainder of
the proof, we can assume that there is at least one i ∈ {1,2} for which Hi is incoherent. Without
loss of generality, symmetry allows us to assume that i= 1, that is, that H1 is incoherent. The only
ex absurdo assumption that still remains is that f ≤ 0.
Since H1 is incoherent, it follows from Lemma 38 that there is some h
∗ ∈H1 such that h
∗ ≤ 0.
Furthermore, since h∗ ∈ H1, Equation (2) implies that h
∗ = λg∗+∑ j∈J λ jh1, j, for some λ ∈ R≥0
and g∗ ∈ G>0(Y1) and, for all j ∈ J, some λ j ∈ R≥0, with λ +∑ j∈J λ j > 0. If λ j = 0 for all j ∈ J,
then λ > 0 and g∗ = 1/λh∗ ≤ 0, which is impossible because g∗ ∈ G>0(Y1). Therefore, we know
that there is at least one j ∈ J such that λ j > 0.
Now let f1 := ∑ j∈J λ j f1, j and fix any x
∗
1 ∈ X1. Since the events in {B1,y1}y1∈Y1 are pairwise
disjoint, there will then be a unique y∗1 ∈ Y1 such that x
∗
1 ∈ B1,y∗1 . For this particular choice of y
∗
1, we
then find that
f1(x
∗
1) = ∑
j∈J
λ j f1, j(x
∗
1)≤ ∑
j∈J
λ j sup
x1∈B1,y∗
1
f1, j(x1) = ∑
j∈J
λ jh1, j(y
∗
1) = h
∗(y∗1)−λg
∗(y∗1)≤ 0,
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where the first equality follows from Equation (33) and the second inequality follows from the fact
that h∗ ≤ 0, λ ≥ 0 and g∗ ∈ G>0(Y1). Since this is true for every x
∗
1 ∈ X1, we infer that f1 ≤ 0.
However, on the other hand, since there is at least one j ∈ J such that λ j > 0, and because f1, j ∈D1
for all j ∈ J, the coherence of D1 implies that f1 ∈ D1 and therefore, because of D4, that f1 6≤ 0.
From this contradiction, it follows that one of our ex absurdo assumptions must be false. Since the
only remaining ex absurdo assumption is that f ≤ 0, this concludes the proof.
Lemma 49 (de Cooman and Miranda, 2012, Lemma 2) Let Ω be a finite set and consider some
finite subset A of G (Ω). Then 0 /∈ E (A ) if and only if there is a probability mass function p on Ω
such that p(ω)> 0 for all ω ∈ Ω and ∑ω∈Ω p(ω) f (ω)> 0 for all f ∈A .
Proposition 50 D1⊗D2 is an independent product of D1 and D2.
Proof of Proposition 50 For ease of notation, let D := D1⊗D2. Because of symmetry, it clearly
suffices to prove that
(∀B2 ∈B2) D1 =marg1(D) =marg1(D |B2),
which, since marg1(D) = marg1(D |X2), is equivalent to proving that, for all f1 ∈ G (X1) and
B2 ∈B2∪{X2},
f1(X1)IB2(X2) ∈D ⇔ f1 ∈D1.
Since f1 ∈D1 implies that f1(X1)IB2(X2)∈A2→1⊆D for all B1 ∈B2∪{X2}, the converse implica-
tion holds trivially. So consider any f1 ∈ G (X1) and B2 ∈B2∪{X2} such that f1(X1)IB2(X2) ∈D .
Since we know from Proposition 48 that D is coherent, this implies that f1 6= 0. It remains to prove
that f1 ∈D1.
Assume ex absurdo that f1 /∈D1. Then since f1 6= 0, D
•
1 := E (D1∪{− f1}) is a coherent set of
desirable gambles on X1 because of Lemma 41, and therefore, if we let
A
•
2→1 :=
{
f ′1(X1)IB′2(X2) : f
′
1 ∈D
•
1 ,B
′
2 ∈B2∪{X2}
}
, (35)
it follows from Proposition 48 that D•1 ⊗D2 := E (A1→2 ∪A
•
2→1) is a coherent set of desirable
gambles on X1×X2. Now on the one hand, since − f1 ∈ D
•
1 , it follows from Equation (35) that
− f1(X1)IB2(X2) ∈ A
•
2→1 ⊆ D
•
1 ⊗D2. On the other hand, since D1 ⊆ D
•
1 implies that D1⊗D2 ⊆
D•1 ⊗D2, we infer from f1(X1)IB2(X2) ∈D that f1(X1)IB2(X2) ∈D
•
1 ⊗D2. Since D
•
1 ⊗D2 is coher-
ent, this implies that
0= f1(X1)IB2(X2)− f1(X1)IB2(X2) ∈D
•
1 ⊗D2,
which contradicts D4.
Proof of Theorem 20 Since we know from Proposition 50 that D1⊗D2 is an independent product
of D1 and D2, it suffices to prove that any other such independent product of D1 and D2 is a superset
of D1⊗D2.
So let D be any independent product ofD1 andD2. Definition 18 then implies that D is coherent
and that A1→2∪A2→1 ⊆D . Hence, we find that
D1⊗D2 = E (A1→2∪A2→1)⊆ E (D) = D ,
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where the inclusion follows from Lemma 39 and the final equality from Lemma 40.
A.4.2 THE CONDITIONAL LOWER PREVISIONS PART
Proposition 51 P1⊗P2 is a coherent conditional probability on C (X1×X2).
Proof of Proposition 51 For all i ∈ {1,2}, since Pi is a coherent conditional lower prevision on Ci,
it follows from Proposition 10 that E (Pi) is a coherent set of desirable gambles on Xi. Therefore,
Proposition 48 implies that E (P1)⊗E (P2) is a coherent set of desirable gambles on X1×X2. The
result now follows from Definition 8.
Proposition 52 Consider two indexes i and j such that {i, j} = {1,2}. Then for any fi ∈ G (Xi)
and Bi ∈P /0(Xi) and any B j ∈B j, we have that
(P1⊗P2)( fi|Bi∩B j) = (P1⊗P2)( fi|Bi) = E i( fi|Bi). (36)
Proof of Proposition 52 For all i∈{1,2}, since Pi is a coherent conditional lower prevision on Ci, it
follows from Proposition 10 that E (Pi) is a coherent set of desirable gambles on Xi. Therefore, we
infer from Proposition 50 that E (P1)⊗E (P2) is an independent product of E (P1) and E (P2). For
ease of notation, we now let P :=P1⊗P2 and D := E (P1)⊗E (P2). As we know from Equation (11),
P is then equal to PD . Furthermore, since D is an independent product of E (P1) and E (P2), we
know that D is epistemically independent and that it has E (P1) and E (P2) as its marginals.
We are now ready to prove Equation (36). In order to do that, we fix any two indexes i and j
such that {i, j} = {1,2}, any fi ∈ G (Xi) and Bi ∈ P /0(Xi) and any B j ∈ B j. We start by proving
the first equality. Since D is epistemically independent, we know that
[ fi−µ ]IBi ∈D ⇔ [ fi−µ ]IBi ∈margi(D)
⇔ [ fi−µ ]IBi ∈margi(D |B j)⇔ [ fi−µ ]IBiIB j ∈D ⇔ [ fi−µ ]IBi∩B j ∈D
for all µ ∈R, and therefore, we find that
P( fi|Bi) = sup
{
µ ∈ R : [ fi−µ ]IBi ∈D
}
= sup
{
µ ∈ R : [ fi−µ ]IBi∩B j ∈D
}
= P( fi|Bi∩B j).
Next, we prove the second equality of Equation (36). SinceD has E (P1) and E (P2) as its marginals,
we know that
[ fi−µ ]IBi ∈D ⇔ [ fi−µ ]IBi ∈margi(D)⇔ [ fi−µ ]IBi ∈ E (Pi)
for all µ ∈R, and therefore, we find that
P( fi|Bi) = sup
{
µ ∈ R : [ fi−µ ]IBi ∈D
}
= sup
{
µ ∈ R : [ fi−µ ]IBi ∈ E (Pi)
}
= E i( fi|Bi),
using Equation 6 to establish the last equality.
Proposition 53 The restriction of P1⊗P2 to C is an independent product of P1 and P2.
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Proof of Proposition 53 Since we know from Proposition 51 that P1⊗P2 is a coherent lower pre-
vision on C (X1×X2), it follows from Definition 8 that its restriction to C is coherent as well. Due
to Definition 21, it remains to show that this restriction of P1⊗P2 to C is epistemically independent
and that it coincides with P1 and P2 on their domain. Epistemic independence follows trivially from
Definition 17 and Proposition 52. Hence, it remains to prove that the restriction of P1⊗P2 to C
coincides with P1 and P2 on their domain, or equivalently, that
(P1⊗P2)( fi|Bi) = Pi( fi|Bi) for all i ∈ {1,2} and ( fi,Bi) ∈ Ci.
So fix any i ∈ {1,2} and ( fi,Bi) ∈ Ci. We then find that indeed, as desired,
(P1⊗P2)( fi|Bi) = E i( fi|Bi) = Pi( fi|Bi),
where the first equality follows from Proposition 52 and the second equality follows from Equa-
tion (6) and Proposition 10.
Proof of Theorem 23 Since we know from Proposition 53 that the restriction of P1⊗P2 to C is
an independent product of P1 and P2, it suffices to prove that any other such independent product of
P1 and P2 dominates P1⊗P2 on C .
So let P be any independent product of P1 and P2. Definition 21 then implies that P is an
epistemically independent coherent conditional lower prevision on C that coincides with P1 and
P2 on their domain. Let AP be the corresponding set of gambles, as defined by Equation (5), and
let D := E (P) = E (AP). We then know from Proposition 10 that D is a coherent set of desirable
gambles on X1×X2 and that PD coincides with P on C . In the remainder of this proof, we will
show that E (P1)⊗ E (P2) ⊆ D . Because of Equation (11), this clearly implies that PD ( f |B) ≥
(P1⊗P2)( f |B) for all ( f ,B) ∈ C . Since PD coincides with P on C , this implies that P dominates
P1⊗P2 on C , thereby concluding the proof.
Let D1 := E (P1) and let A2→1 be the corresponding set of gambles on X1×X2, as defined by
Equation (10). We will now prove that A2→1 ⊆ D . So consider any f1 ∈ D1 and any B2 ∈ B2∪
{X2}. We need to prove that f1(X1)IB2(X2) ∈D . Since f1 ∈D1 = E (P1) = posi(AP1 ∪G>0(X1)),
it follows from Equation (1) that there are n ∈ N and, for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}, λi ∈ R>0 and gi ∈
AP1 ∪G>0(X1) such that f1 = ∑
n
i=1 λigi.
For any i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}, we now let hi(X1,X2) := gi(X1)IB2(X2) ∈ G (X1 ×X2). As we will
show, this gamble hi belongs to D . We consider two cases: gi ∈ G>0(X1) and gi /∈ G>0(X1). If
gi ∈ G>0(X1), then hi ∈ G>0(X1×X2), which, since D is a coherent set of desirable gambles
on X1 ×X2, implies that hi ∈ D . If gi 6∈ G>0, then since gi ∈ AP1 ∪G>0(X1), it follows that
gi ∈AP1 , which implies that there are ( f
′
1,B1) ∈ C1 and µ < P1( f
′
1|B1) such that gi = [ f
′
1− µ ]IB1 .
Furthermore, since P coincides with P1 on its domain, we also know that P1( f
′
1|B1) = P( f
′
1|B1).
If B2 = X2, Equation (5) therefore implies that hi ∈ AP ⊆ D because IB2 = 1. If B2 6= X2, then
B2 ∈B2. Since P is epistemically independent, this implies that P( f
′
1|B1) = P( f
′
1|B1∩B2). Hence,
here too, Equation (5) implies that hi ∈AP ⊆D—because IB1∩B2 = IB1IB2 .
In summary then, we have found that hi ∈ D for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}. Since f1 = ∑
n
i=1 λigi, this
implies that
f1(X1)IB2(X2) =
(
n
∑
i=1
λigi(X1)
)
IB2(X2) =
n
∑
i=1
λigi(X1)IB2(X2) =
n
∑
i=1
λihi(X1,X2) ∈D ,
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where the inclusion holds because D is coherent. Since this is true for every f1 ∈ D1 and every
B2 ∈B2∪{X2}, it follows that A2→1 ⊆D . Using a completely analogous argument, it also follows
that A1→2 ⊆ D , with A1→2 defined by Equation (9) for D2 := E (P2). Hence, we find that A1→2∪
A2→1 ⊆D , and therefore, that
E (P1)⊗E (P2) = D1⊗D2 = E (A1→2∪A2→1)⊆ E (D) = D ,
where the second equality follows from Equation (8), the inclusion follows from Lemma 39, and
the last equality follows from Lemma 40.
A.5 Proofs and Additional Material for Section 6
Proof of Proposition 24 We only prove the result for D1⊗D2. The result for P1⊗P2 then follows
trivially from Equation (11).
Let D1⊗D2 be the independent natural extension that corresponds to B1 and B2, as defined by
Equations (8)–(10), and let D1⊗
′D2 be the independent natural extension that corresponds to B
′
1
and B′2, defined by
D1⊗
′
D2 := E
(
A
′
1→2∪A
′
2→1
)
,
with
A
′
1→2 :=
{
f2(X2)IB′1(X1) : f2 ∈D2,B
′
1 ∈B
′
1∪{X1}
}
and
A
′
2→1 :=
{
f1(X1)IB′2(X2) : f1 ∈D1,B
′
2 ∈B
′
2∪{X2}
}
.
Then as explained in the main text, in the paragraph that precedes Proposition 24, we have that
D1⊗D2 ⊆D1⊗
′D2. It remains to prove that D1⊗
′D2 ⊆D1⊗D2.
Fix any f2 ∈ D2 and B
′
1 ∈ B
′
1 ∪ {X1}. We will prove that f2(X2)IB′1(X1) ∈ D1 ⊗D2. If
B′1 = X1, this follows trivially from Equations (8) and (9). Otherwise, it follows from our as-
sumptions that there is some m ∈ N and, for all k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, some B1,k ∈ B1 such that B
′
1 is
a finite disjoint union of the events {B1,k}1≤k≤m, which implies that IB′1 = ∑
m
k=1 IB1,k and there-
fore also that f2(X2)IB′1(X1) = ∑
m
k=1 f2(X2)IB1(X1). Hence, Equations (8) and (9) again imply that
f2(X2)IB′1(X1) ∈D1⊗D2. Since this is true for every f2 ∈D2 and B
′
1 ∈B
′
1∪{X1}, it follows that
A ′1→2 ⊆ D1⊗D2. Using a completely analogous argument, we also infer that A
′
2→1 ⊆ D1⊗D2.
The result now follows because A ′1→2∪A
′
2→1 ⊆D1⊗D2 implies that
D1⊗
′
D2 = E
(
A
′
1→2∪A
′
2→1
)
⊆ E (D1⊗D2) = D1⊗D2,
using Lemma 39 for the inclusion and Lemma 40 and Proposition 48 for the last equality.
A.6 Proofs and Additional Material for Section 7
Lemma 54 For any f ∈ G (X1) and h ∈ G (X2) and any simple B1-measurable g ∈ G≥0(X1), we
have that
(P1⊗P2)( f +gh)≥ E1
(
f +gE2(h)
)
.
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Proof of Lemma 54 Since g ∈ G≥0(X1) is a simple B-measurable gamble, we know from Defi-
nition 1 that there are c0 ∈ R≥0, n ∈ N0 and, for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}, ci ∈ R≥0 and Bi ∈B1, such that
g = c0+∑
n
i=1 ciIBi . Furthermore, since we know from Proposition 51 that P1⊗P2 is coherent, it
follows from Proposition 12 that P1⊗P2 satisfies LP2, LP3 and LP4. Finally, since E2 is coherent,
we know from Proposition 12 that it satisfies LP6. Therefore, we find that
(P1⊗P2)( f +gh) = (P1⊗P2)
(
f +gE2(h)+
(
c0+
n
∑
i=1
ciIBi
)
[h−E2(h)]
)
≥ (P1⊗P2)
(
f +gE2(h)
)
+ c0(P1⊗P2)
(
h−E2(h)
)
+
n
∑
i=1
ci(P1⊗P2)
(
IBi [h−E2(h)]
)
= E1
(
f +gE2(h)
)
+ c0E2
(
h−E2(h)
)
+
n
∑
i=1
ci(P1⊗P2)
(
IBi [h− (P1⊗P2)(h|Bi)]
)
= E1
(
f +gE2(h)
)
+ c0
(
E2(h)−E2(h)
)
= E1
(
f +gE2(h)
)
,
where the first equality follows because g = c0+∑
n
i=1 ciIBi , where the first inequality follows be-
cause P1⊗P2 satisfies LP3 and LP2, where the second equality follows from Proposition 52, and
where the third equality follows because E2 satisfies LP6 and P1⊗P2 satisfies LP4.
Lemma 55 For any f ∈ G (X1) and h ∈ G (X2) and any simple B1-measurable g ∈ G≥0(X1), we
have that
(P1⊗P2)( f +gh)≤ E1
(
f +gE2(h)
)
.
Proof of Lemma 55 Since E2 is a coherent conditional lower prevision on C (X2), we know from
Proposition 46 that there is a conditional linear prevision P2 on C (X2) such that P2(h) = E2(h) and
P2 ≥ E2. Similarly, since E1 is a coherent conditional lower prevision on C (X1), we know from
Proposition 46 that there is a conditional linear prevision P1 on C (X1) such that P1
(
f +gE2(h)
)
=
E1
(
f +gE2(h)
)
and P1 ≥ E1.
Consider now any i∈ {1,2}. We then know from Proposition 42 that E i coincides with Pi on Ci.
Therefore, and because Pi ≥ E i, we also know that Pi dominates Pi on Ci. Due to Equation (5), this
implies that APi ⊆APi and therefore, using Lemma 39, also that E (Pi)⊆ E (Pi). Since this is true for
every i ∈ {1,2}, it follows from Equation (8) and Lemma 39 that E (P1)⊗E (P2)⊆ E (P1)⊗E (P2),
and therefore, because of Equation (11), that P1⊗P2 ≤ P1⊗P2.
The result can now be proved as follows. First, since P1⊗P2 ≤ P1⊗P2, we find that
(P1⊗P2)( f +gh)≤ (P1⊗P2)( f +gh). (37)
Secondly, since we know from Proposition 51 that (P1⊗P2) is coherent, it follows from Proposi-
tion 12 that (P1⊗P2) satisfies LP8, which implies that
(P1⊗P2)( f +gh)≤−(P1⊗P2)(− f −gh)≤−P1
(
− f +gP2(−h)
)
, (38)
using Lemma 54 for the second inequality. Finally, we also know that
−P1
(
− f +gP2(−h)
)
= P1
(
f +gP2(h)
)
= E1
(
f +gE2(h)
)
, (39)
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where the first equality follows from Definitions 28 and 29 because P1 and P2 are conditional linear
previsions, and where the second equality follows because P2(h) = E2(h) and P1
(
f + gE2(h)
)
=
E1
(
f +gE2(h)
)
. By combining Equations (37)–(39), the result is now immediate.
Proposition 56 For any f ∈ G (X1) and h ∈ G (X2) and any simple B1-measurable g ∈ G≥0(X1),
we have that
(P1⊗P2)( f +gh) = E1
(
f +gE2(h)
)
.
Proof of Proposition 56 Immediate consequence of Lemmas 54 and 55.
Proof of Theorem 25 Since g ∈ G≥0(X1) is B1-measurable, we know from Definition 2 that
there is a sequence {gn}n∈N of simple B1-measurable gambles in G≥0(X1) such that gn converges
uniformly to g. This also implies that f +gnE2(h) converges uniformly to f +gE2(h) and, since h
is a gamble and therefore by definition bounded, that f + gnh converges uniformly to f + gh. The
result now follows from the following series of equalities:
(P1⊗P2)( f +gh) = lim
n→+∞
(P1⊗P2)( f +gnh) = lim
n→+∞
E1
(
f +gnE2(h)
)
= E1
(
f +gE2(h)
)
.
The first of these equalities holds because it follows from Propositions 51 and 12 that P1⊗P2 sat-
isfies LP5. The second equality follows from Proposition 56. The third equality holds because the
coherence of E1 allows us to infer from Proposition 12 that E1 satisfies LP5.
Proof of Corollary 26 Let f := 0 ∈ G (Xi). We then know from Theorem 25 that
(P1⊗P2)(gh) = (P1⊗P2)( f +gh) = E i
(
f +gE j(h)
)
= E i
(
gE j(h)
)
.
The result can now be inferred from the non-negative homogeneity—LP2—of E i that is implied
by its coherence. If E j(h) ≥ 0, we simply apply the non-negative homogeneity for λ := E j(h). If
E j(h) ≤ 0, we apply it for λ :=−E j(h) and combine this with the fact that E i(g) :=−E i(−g).
Proof of Corollary 27 Let g := 1. Then g belongs to G≥0(X1) and is B1-measurable. Therefore,
we know from Theorem 25 that
(P1⊗P2)( f +h) = (P1⊗P2)( f +gh) = E1
(
f +gE2(h)
)
= E1
(
f +E2(h)
)
.
The result now follows from the constant additivity—LP6—of E1 that is implied by its coherence.
A.7 Proofs and Additional Material for Section 9
Proof of Proposition 36 Fix any ε > 0. It then follows from Equations (11) and (3) that there is
some µ ∈R such that µ > (P1⊗P2)( f )−ε and f −µ ∈ E (P1)⊗E (P2). Consider any such µ . Since
f −µ ∈ E (P1)⊗E (P2), it follows from Equations (8), (9), (10), (2) and (1) that
f −µ = g+
n
∑
i=1
λi f2,i(X2)IB1,i(X1)+
m
∑
j=1
λ j f1, j(X1)IB2, j(X2)
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with g ∈ G≥0 and n,m ∈N0 and, for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}, λi ∈R>0, f2,i ∈ E (P2) and B1,i ∈B1∪{X1}
and, for all j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, λ j ∈ R>0, f1, j ∈ E (P1) and B2, j ∈ B2 ∪{X2}. Since P12 is a linear
prevision—and hence satisfies P1–P3—this implies that
P12( f ) = P12(µ)+P12(g)+
n
∑
i=1
λiP12( f2,i(X2)IB1,i(X1))+
m
∑
j=1
λ jP12( f1, j(X1)IB2, j(X2))
≥ µ +
n
∑
i=1
λiP12( f2,i(X2)IB1,i(X1))+
m
∑
j=1
λ jP12( f1, j(X1)IB2, j(X2))
Furthermore, for any i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}, there are two cases. If B1,i = X1, then
P12( f2,i(X2)IB1,i(X1)) = P12( f2,i(X2)) = P2( f2,i)≥ 0,
where the second equality follows from our assumptions on P12 and the third equality follows from
Lemma 44. If B1,i ∈B1, then
P12( f2,i(X2)IB1,i(X1))≥ P12( inf
x2∈X2
f2,iIB1,i(X1)) = inf
x2∈X2
f2,iP12(IB1,i(X1)) = inf
x2∈X2
f2,iP1(IB1,i) = 0,
where the inequality follows from LP7, the first equality follows from P2 and the last two equal-
ities follow from our assumptions on P12 and P1 and from the fact that—since we consider atom-
independence—B1,i ∈ B1 implies that there is some x1 ∈X1 such that B1,i = {x1} and hence also
P1(IB1,i) = P1(Ix1) = 0. In both cases, we find that P12( f2,i(X2)IB1,i(X1)) ≥ 0. Similarly, for any
j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, we find that P12( f1, j(X1)IB2, j(X2)) ≥ 0. Hence, it follows that P12( f ) ≥ µ . Since
µ > (P1⊗P2)( f )− ε , this implies that P12( f ) > (P1⊗P2)( f )− ε , and, since ε > 0 is arbitrary, this
in turn implies that P12( f ) ≥ (P1⊗P2)( f ). This already establishes the first inequality of the state-
ment. For the second equality of the statement, it suffices to apply the first equality to − f , yielding
(P1⊗P2)(− f )≤ P12(− f ). Indeed, since P12 is linear, this trivially implies that
(P1⊗P2)( f ) =−(P1⊗P2)(− f )≥−P12(− f ) = P12( f ),
thereby establishing the second inequality of the statement.
Proof of Proposition 37 Fix any ε > 0. It then follows from Equations (11) and (3) that there is
some µ ∈R such that µ > (P1⊗P2)( f )−ε and f −µ ∈ E (P1)⊗E (P2). Consider any such µ . Since
f −µ ∈ E (P1)⊗E (P2), it follows from Equations (8), (9), (10), (2) and (1) that
f −µ = g+
n
∑
i=1
λi f2,i(X2)IB1,i(X1)+
m
∑
j=1
λ j f1, j(X1)IB2, j(X2)
with g ∈ G≥0 and n,m ∈N0 and, for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}, λi ∈R>0, f2,i ∈ E (P2) and B1,i ∈B1∪{X1}
and, for all j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, λ j ∈R>0, f1, j ∈ E (P1) and B2, j ∈B2∪{X2}. Since P1 and P2 are linear
previsions—and hence satisfy P1–P3—this implies that
P1(P2( f )) = P1(P2(µ)+P1(P2(g))+
n
∑
i=1
λiP1(P2( f2,i(X2)IB1,i(X1)))+
m
∑
j=1
λ jP1(P2( f1, j(X1)IB2, j(X2)))
≥ µ +
n
∑
i=1
λiP1(P2( f2,i(X2))IB1,i(X1))+
m
∑
j=1
λ jP1( f1, j(X1)P2(IB2, j(X2)))
= µ +
n
∑
i=1
λiP1(IB1,i(X1))P2( f2,i(X2))+
m
∑
j=1
λ jP1( f1, j(X1))P2(IB2, j(X2)).
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Furthermore, for any i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}, it follows from Lemma 44 that P2( f2,i(X2)) ≥ 0 and from P1
that P1(IB1,i(X1)) ≥ 0, which implies that λiP1(IB1,i(X1))P2( f2,i(X2)) ≥ 0. Similarly, for any j ∈
{1, . . . ,m}, we find that λ jP1( f1, j(X1))P2(IB2, j(X2))≥ 0. Hence, it follows that P1(P2( f ))≥ µ . Since
µ > (P1⊗P2)( f )− ε , this implies that P1(P2( f )) > (P1⊗P2)( f )− ε , and, since ε > 0 is arbitrary,
this in turn implies that P1(P2( f ))≥ (P1⊗P2)( f ). This already establishes the first inequality of the
statement. For the second equality of the statement, it suffices to apply the first equality to − f ,
yielding (P1⊗P2)(− f )≤ P1(P2(− f )). Indeed, since P1 and P2 are linear, this trivially implies that
(P1⊗P2)( f ) =−(P1⊗P2)(− f )≥−P1(P2(− f )) = P1(P2( f )),
thereby establishing the second inequality of the statement.
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